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1 Introduction 
Cities are more than centers of production. They are also more than just the living place 
for the majority of people around the globe. Cities are centers of leisure, consumption and 
aesthetic beauty. This view stands in some contrast to the classic perspective economists 
have long taken on cities. Accordingly, economic concentrations are the outcome of either 
natural advantages or the mutual attraction of firms that benefit from agglomeration 
economies. Workers are then pulled towards these economic concentrations due to the 
interplay of higher wages and reduced commuting costs. Access to attractive employment 
opportunities, accordingly, overcompensates for costs associated with living in congested 
downtowns, which ultimately reflects in higher rents for living space. The phenomenon 
that wealthier households tend to live in suburban areas rather than downtowns in many 
metropolitan areas has supported the view that central cities are, mostly, undesirable 
places to live.1 
More recently, however, some economists have started to challenge this view. Firms have 
been argued to become increasingly “footloose” due to improvements in transportation 
and communication technology and to ultimately follow people. It has also been acknowl-
edged that there are not only scale economies in the production of goods and services, but 
also in the provision of consumption amenities. Specific amenities that address diverse 
tastes, e.g., specialized ethnic restaurants, theaters or other entertainment establishments 
require a large consumer base to operate efficiently. As workers become richer, more edu-
cated, leisure oriented and, not least, more diverse in their lifestyle orientations, a highly 
skilled workforce, sometimes referred to as a creative class (Florida, 2002), becomes in-
creasingly attracted by places with ethnical, cultural and consumption diversity that, often, 
only central cities can offer. As put down by Glaeser et al. (2001), “[t]he future of cities 
depends on the demand for density”. Certainly it will depend on the ability of cities to at-
tract the most qualified workforce, which will in turn attract human capital intensive in-
dustries.  
Glaeser et al. (2001) classify four basic categories of urban amenities: [1] the quality and 
variety of consumption goods; [2] the physical setting, including aesthetic and in particu-
                                                             
1  See Brückner et al. (1999) for theoretical discussion of income segregation, accompanied by 
stylized facts. 
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lar architectural beauty; [3] public services; and [4] efficient transport.2 Understanding 
how these features define “attractive” urban spaces means understanding how cities can 
enhance their abilities to adapt to the (changing) requirements of human capital workers 
and eventually be economically successful. Recent urban economics research has made 
considerable advances in empirically assessing the value of [3] and [4], e.g., the quality of 
schools, public transport or crime levels, which are often observable based on official rec-
ords. Typically, a positive and sizable willingness to pay for these features is revealed by 
micro-level hedonic analyses of property prices and rich surveys are available that pro-
vide a condensed image of the findings (Gibbons & Machin, 2008). It has been more diffi-
cult, however, to quantify what constitutes an attractive urban space in terms of local con-
sumption varieties [1] and architectural quality [2], which, arguably, are among the most 
typical dimensions of urbanity. Some evidence is available for selected large-scale con-
sumption amenities such as sports facilities and franchises (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010a; 
Carlino & Coulson, 2004), architectural beauty, usually in the context of preserved historic 
buildings (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010b; Coulson & Lahr, 2005) or cultural facilities 
(Ahlfeldt, 2011a; Bille & Schulze, 2006). While generally revealing positive amenity effects, 
such studies are typically very selective with respect to the range of considered amenities 
and imperfect at best in capturing the whole entity of features that together constitute 
what is perceived as an attractive urban place.  
Carlino & Saiz (2008) offer a compelling alternative. Instead of capturing amenities direct-
ly, they make use of the number of leisure trips to metropolitan statistical areas as a 
measure of consumers' revealed preferences for local leisure-oriented amenities. They 
show that, based on that definition, more attractive cities substantially exceed their less 
attractive counterparts in terms of employment and population growth and are particular-
ly attractive to the highly educated. The downside of this composite amenity index is that 
spatial detail is lost and we learn less about what type of amenities specifically increases 
the attractiveness of urban places. Carlino & Saiz (2008) partially remedy these limitations 
by looking into cities, albeit at a relatively aggregated level. As their measure of revealed 
                                                             
2  Closely related, Brückner et al. (1999) define three categories of amenities, [a] natural amenities, 
[b] historic amenities and [c] modern amenities. In their model, [a] and [b] are considered exo-
genous and eventually determine the location of high income, amenity affine households. They 
correspond to category [2] defined by Glaeser et al. (2001), whose category [1] roughly corres-
ponds to [c]. 
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preferences is not available at a sub city level, they rely on a comparison of central recrea-
tional districts (CRD) to the rest of cites and proximity to a limited number of recreational 
amenities. Within these limitations, they find that more attractive places within cities, in 
terms of amenities, performed superior in terms of economic growth.  
In this paper I pursue a hybrid of both strategies, that is, I look into the city and use a re-
vealed preference amenity index which I merge to a broad range of observable amenities 
and property data at the maximum spatial detail. As a revealed preference indicator of the 
attractiveness of urban places I make use of millions of individual photographs taken and 
shared at web-communities with a detailed spatial reference. While I presume that higher 
photo densities per spatial unit reflect more attractive spaces throughout the paper, this 
definition is, of course, not without limitations. For one thing, the propensity of photos 
being taken at a certain location is not necessarily linearly related to the average percep-
tion of, for example, aesthetic beauty. For another thing, those sharing their pictures in 
web communities such as Flickr or Picasa are very likely a sample selected group. Howev-
er, I argue that, first, users of this type of new media form precisely the young, creative and 
high-skilled class that cities aim to attract to be economically successful, and, second, an 
attractive urban space does not need to appeal to the average, but the marginal buyer (or 
renter). Places that are perceived to be interesting enough to be photographed by a large 
number of people, therefore, qualify as attractive places in the sense that is relevant for 
this study.  
To the degree possible, I merge these data with observable location characteristics. In ad-
dition to standard urban economics variables, e.g., distance to transport infrastructure, 
employment access, natural amenities or public services, I also compile a data set of less 
common features. Among them are cultural consumption amenities, i.e., important muse-
ums, theaters and cinemas. Moreover, I borrow from Bass van Heur’s fieldwork and geo-
code hundreds of avant-garde music venues, such as clubs, record labels, etc., to define an 
index of alternative cultural activity based on the address list provided in the appendix of 
his PhD (van Heur, 2008). For architectural quality, besides making use of official preser-
vation records, I geocode hundreds of contemporary and historic landmark buildings 
based on architecture guides (Allinson, 2009; Haubrich, Hoffmann, Meuser, & Uffelen, 
2010). To arrive at a limited degree of generalizabilty at the cost of doubling the data col-
lection and processing, I conduct the analysis for two European metropolises: Berlin, Ger-
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many, and London, UK. These cities fall into the first category of resurgent dense cities 
defined by Glaeser et al. (2001) and qualify as natural study areas for an investigation of 
urbanity and the associated perceived attractiveness. These cities correspond to US amen-
ity city counterparts such as New York, San Francisco, Boston or Chicago.  
The structure of the paper follows the main argument. The next section introduces the 
new revealed preference measure by providing stylized facts and descriptive evidence on 
the spatial photo pattern. I show that the spatial distribution of photo densities follows the 
observable determinants as expected and argue that this is reason to believe that the same 
should hold for unobservables, i.e., a high photo density is a good proxy for attractive ur-
ban places or “urbanity”. In section three, I move on to analyze whether and how urbanity 
impacts on household and firm location decisions. At this stage, I use a simple urban bid-
rent model to guide the analysis and help interpret the results of a battery of empirical 
tests based on various response variables. Previewing my results, I conclude in the last 
section that there is a significant willingness to pay for urbanity by firms and residents, 
especially by the high-skilled. 
2 The Geography of Photography 
In this section I introduce a new data set of individual photographs shared by users of web 
communities, which I use to construct revealed preference indicators of interesting and 
attractive urban places. Figure 1 shows the raw data. They stem from Eric Fisher’s fasci-
nating Geotaggers' World Atlas, whose observations are taken from Flickr and Picasa 
search APIs.3 The bounds of the square observation areas with 15 miles on each side are 
chosen to include as many geotagged locations as possible near the respective central clus-
ter. In total, the data set after deletion of pictures with incomprehensive dates comprises 
633,764 individual observations in the case of Berlin and 1,849,403 for London respec-
tively. With these data at hand, what exactly motivates people to take pictures of places is 
an obvious question. Intuitively, locations that are frequently photographed must be fasci-
nating enough to be of human interest, which in an urban context I define to correspond to 
a sense of “urbanity”. Certainly, these places are attractive to a relatively large number of 
                                                             
3 See for details http://www.flickr.com/photos/walkingsf/sets/72157623971287575/.  
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people. What exactly makes these places attractive is a question I attempt to investigate 
empirically within the constraints of observable location characteristics.  
Another natural question to ask regarding the revealed expressions of interest that be-
comes evident from the photography geography is to which degree tourists and residents 
differ in their photo behavior. While from the data set it is not possible to observe the 
place of residence and to sharply distinguish between the two groups, the individual pat-
tern of photos taken by a user at various cities over time facilitates the construction of 
categories of users that are likely tourists or residents. I follow Fisher’s decision rule and 
define users that took pictures in one of the study cities over less than one month and over 
a longer period in another city as tourists, and those taking pictures in one of the study 
cities over more than a month as residents. Inevitably, this definition leaves a residual 
category of users and pictures that cannot be assigned to either category. Table 2 tabulates 
the photos in the data set by city, year and category. Clearly, it shows the increasing popu-
larity of both web-platforms since their start in 2002 (Picasa) and 2004 (Fickr) among 
residents and tourists. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
To analyze the spatial distribution of photos, I aggregate the individual photo observations 
to a density index that can be merged with other data. Specifically, I calculate the number 
of photos per square kilometer, weighted by the total number of photos taken in a given 
year, for each of the 11,549 statistical blocks in Berlin that fall into the observation zone. 
These spatial blocks are officially defined based on homogeneity considerations and small 
enough to yield a high spatial detail while at the same time large enough to result in mean-
ingful densities (median surface AREA 0.18 km²). For similar reasons, I calculate photo 
densities (PD) for 13,765 official output areas within the respective zone in London 
(median surface AREA 0.27 km²).  
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 ]   (1) 
where 2002 ≤ t ≤ 2009 denotes the year when a photo j was taken in block i, T=8 is the 
number of years included in the analysis, nijt are the total number of photos taken in year t 
in block i, and Nt is the total number of photos in a given year. The resulting photo densi-
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ties are mapped in Figure 2. It is evident that in both cases the photo geography forms a 
map from which the city is recognizable with some knowledge of the local urban geogra-
phy. In the case of Berlin, both the traditional CBD as well as the City-West spreading along 
the boulevards Kurfürstendamm and Tauentzienstrasse can be identified. Similarly, high 
photo densities are evident around major recreation spaces and tourist spots like the cen-
tral park Tiergarten, the Spree River, Charlottenburg Palace, including the respective gar-
dens, or the East-Side Gallery, a strip of the former Berlin Wall, painted by street artists. 
Similarly, the central areas in London around the City and the City of Westminster are vis-
ible, but also green spaces and tourist destinations like Hyde Park, Kensington Gardens, 
Thames River, Green Park, Buckingham Palace, Greenwich or Richmond. A first inspection 
indicates that interesting urban places can be of a very distinct nature, including both 
places of high economic density or low density recreation spaces but, in general, central 
places tend to attract more attention. The pattern of pictures taken, moreover, is very sim-
ilar for residents and tourists, though it seems slightly more concentrated for the latter. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE  
Table 2 shows how blocks of respectively output areas that have been photographed differ 
from those that did not in terms of observable characteristics; in each case for the total 
population, tourists and residents. Evidently, photo activity is more concentrated in Berlin. 
About 45.5% of the blocks in the study areas of Berlin feature no recorded photos com-
pared to only 21.6% of London output areas. Within these blocks, however, the mean pho-
to density is about six times as high as for the respective output areas in London. Never-
theless, differences between photo and non-photo areas in both cities are fairly consistent 
and in line with expectations. Photo destinations are generally more central, both in terms 
of distance to the central business district (CBD) and the nearest rapid transport stations 
as well as in terms of the proportion of blocks and output areas along primary roads. They 
also exhibit about four times higher employment densities. Locations within the photo 
group also have a higher probability of featuring natural amenity areas, e. g., parks and 
waterways, and signature buildings (contemporary in the case of Berlin, contemporary 
and historic in the case of London). Similarly, the average number of major cultural facili-
ties, i.e., museums, theaters, cinemas, etc., is also by several orders of magnitude higher in 
the photo group for both cities. Alternative music nodes similarly concentrate in photo 
areas, although the discrepancy is considerably more pronounced for London. As ex-
7
pected, the top tourist destinations compiled as a list of the 20 mostly cited top-sights in 
various tourist guides, fall exclusively into the photo group. As suspected from the visual 
inspection of the maps in Figure 2, there are hardly any systematic differences between 
densities in the tourist and resident blocks and output areas, though densities in the latter 
are generally somewhat higher. In brief, locations with photo activity are by all definitions 
more attractive, i.e., economically more central, more beautiful and culturally more inter-
esting.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Another approach to exploring the nature of photography geography is to look at how 
photo densities change in selected location attributes, given there is photo activity. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates pairwise correlations of the log of photo density as defined above and 
selected variables, with graphs in the left (right) column referring to Berlin (London).  
Evidently, there is a clear negative relationship between the photo density and the dis-
tance to the CBD, somewhat resembling the predictions of monocentric models for unit 
prices of housing space and land and various economic densities (Alonso, 1964; Mills, 
1972; Muth, 1969). This is an interesting finding in the context of this analysis as classic 
(bid-rent) models derive such a negative relationship from reductions in transport costs 
that pull residents and firms into the center where all employment opportunities and ag-
glomeration economies concentrate. It is, however, not clear a priori why photographers’ 
choices of their subjects should be constrained in the same way. This pattern could be in-
dicative of central areas being attractive places for reasons that are not directly related to 
the classic urban contraction forces. Similarly strongly, there is a positive correlation be-
tween photo densities and employment densities, indicating that centers of economic ac-
tivity besides the frequently discussed economic spillovers may create a visually appealing 
environment. 
A natural question to pursue is how correlated photo densities are with other revealed 
preference indices of location quality. The, arguably, most popular measure in urban eco-
nomics are land values or, if not directly available, the location component embedded in 
property prices, which can be interpreted as a willingness to pay for location quality. Of 
course, that indicator is less specific with respect to the amenity endowment of a location 
as it also – or according to standard theories – primarily comprises the classic economic 
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determinant of urban land value: accessibility. Still, or especially for that reason, a compar-
ison between both indicators yields interesting insights. Notably, there is a positive and 
approximately (log) linear correlation between the value of land, as reflected in standard 
land values assessed by the Committee of Valuation Experts in Berlin and photo densities, 
that is, there is a positive willingness to pay for places that are attractive according to the 
photo index scores. Similar land values were not readily available for London. To isolate 
the implicit price paid for location from observable property prices, I run a simple regres-
sion of log of transaction prices on observable property characteristics as well as year and 
output area fixed effects. By recovering the latter, I obtain a land value proxy that I plot 
against (log) of photo densities in Figure 3.4 Again, there is a strong and positive correla-
tion between the willingness to pay for location and the attractiveness of urban space as 
defined by the amenity indicator. The distribution of land values (Berlin) and the estimat-
ed location component in observable property prices (London) is depicted in Figure A1 in 
the appendix. 
The last stylized fact that I present is related to the abovementioned idea that certain pop-
ulation groups, e.g. the so called creative class or simply the highly qualified, productive 
avant-garde that are argued to be so important for the future of cities, are specifically at-
tracted by a sense of urbanity, i.e. high amenity urban space, because of particular con-
sumption preferences. This would be reflected by a higher proportion of these population 
groups among the resident population living in areas with higher photo densities. To give 
an indication of such a spatial correlation, I develop a qualification index for each output 
area in London based on the 2000 census records, which is basically the average of the 
qualification score at a given location, weighted by the share of the local population in the 
respective categories.5 And indeed, as evident from the lower right panel of Figure 3, there 
is a clear concentration of this population group in urbanity locations.  
                                                             
4  The regression equation takes the following form:    (   )  ∑                , where  ̂  
are the recovered output area fixed effects, P is the transaction price per square meter floor 
space and X is a vector of observable location characteristics. I use the well established Nation-
wide Building Society data set, which has been used, among others, by Gibbons & Machin (2005). 
They provide a detailed discussion of the data, including the property characteristics. 
5  The qualification index (QI) is constructed as follows for each output area where sn is the qualifi-
cation score and pn the population within a qualification category:    ∑   
  
∑    
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It is more difficult to find a comprehensive human capital indicator for Berlin as no official 
qualification records are available at a reasonably fine geographic level. One arguably 
crude way to capture some social phenomena is to make use of a recent phenomenon in 
the German political landscape: the raise of the Green Party (Die Grünen). Emerging from 
radical ecological movements in the 1980s, the party over the recent decades has evolved 
into a liberal, eco-orientated mainstream party, which participated as a junior partner in 
the SPD led governing coalition at the federal level from 1998 to 2005. Socio-economic 
analyses reveal that voters of the Green Party are typically characterized by an above-
average education and modernistic lifestyle attitude (Klein & Arzheimer, 1997). They form 
a milieu that shares similarities with Richard Florida’s definition of a creative class. Pro-
portions of Green Voters from the 2006 Berlin state elections are available at a reasonably 
fine spatial level of 1,201 voting precincts. Aggregating photo densities to the same level, a 
clearly positive correlation emerges, likely an effect of a particularly strong preference for 
urbanity of the captured political and social milieu.  
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
These stylized facts support the idea that central cities may have something to offer that 
goes beyond the mere concentration of employment opportunities and agglomeration 
economies in the production of goods: a sense of urbanity that makes them interesting 
enough to be recorded in the (digitial) memories of photographers sharing millions of geo-
referenced pictures with the rest of the world. Even though residents seem to have a siza-
ble willingness to pay for these areas, it would be premature to dismiss alternative and 
more traditional urban contraction forces as determinants of the spatial structure of cities. 
Figure 2 indicates that the amenity index is strongly correlated with economic density, 
which could ultimately be the driving force that attracts both residents and photogra-
phers.  
I devote more attention to disentangling the effects of access to economic mass and urban-
ity on residents’ and firms’ location decisions in the next section. Before, I validate the 
purely descriptive evidence presented so far by estimating partial correlations among the 
photo index and locational variables using multivariate regressions. I first run bivariete 
logit regressions to shed light on the features that determine whether or not photo activity 
10
takes place at a given location, which corresponds to an extension of the descriptive evi-
dence presented in Table 2.6 Second, I run OLS regressions to establish partial correlations 
among (log) photo densities and location characteristics for areas where photo activity 
takes place, which extends evidence from Figure 3. Third, I run photo level logit regres-
sions to determine which factors make it more likely that a picture has been taken by a 
(presumed) tourist or resident. 
Table 3 (Berlin) and 4 (London) present the results. All effects from logit models are ex-
pressed as marginal effects at the mean. The evidence is fairly in line with intuition and the 
stylized facts discussed above. Central areas, even conditional on observable economic 
and amenity characteristics receive particularly high attention by photographers. The like-
lihood of being in the photo sample is reduced by about 25% for an additional km distance 
to the CBD (1). Within the blocks in the photo group, an additional km reduces the photo 
density by about 32% in Berlin and 20% in London (2). At the same time, all natural, built 
and cultural amenities impact significantly positively on photo densities as expected. As 
expected, locations with major tourist hotspots enjoy particular popularity. A notable ex-
ception among the considered location features is population density, which consistently 
reduces the likelihood of a location being photographed when holding other observable 
factors constant. This is an interesting and important finding as it suggests that photos are 
not simply taken where people live. Distinguishing between samples of tourist and resi-
dent pictures the pattern in columns (3) to (6) suggests that, with the exception of popula-
tion density, all considered location features exhibit a stronger impact on tourists’ than 
residents’ photo decisions. Still, the direction of effects in column (3) and (4) is consistent 
and, mostly, within the same order of magnitude. Throughout the rest of the paper, I there-
fore use the pooled sample of all pictures to exploit the total wealth of information. 
Overall, the satisfying explanatory power together with the expected and consistent direc-
tions of effects should be reassuring that geocoded photos serve the intended purpose. As 
an indicator of revealed preferences they show which urban locations benefit from a fa-
vorable endowment with amenities that make these places more interesting and attrac-
tive. In other words, I argue that the plausible (partial) correlations in observables en-
                                                             
6  This well-known model where p stands for the probability that photo activity takes places at a 
given location takes the following form:     (
 
   
 )    ∑           
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courage the application of these data to capture otherwise unobservable location quality 
in urban research, which is what I do in the next section.  
3    The Value of Urbanity 
3.1   Theoretical Framework 
Classic bid-rent theory, arguably, represents the workhorse of urban economics (Alonso, 
1964). Accordingly, the location decision of firms and household are driven by a trade-off 
of access to a dimensionless point called the central business district (CBD) and the price 
of a scarce and homogenous recourse economic actors are bidding for: land. The CBD is 
the destination of all commuting and the source of all agglomeration economies. Of course, 
this useful but simplistic view on cities needs to be extended to fully understand the role 
cities are playing as centers of beauty, leisure and consumption.  
To guide my empirical analyses, I borrow from a consolidated body of theoretical urban 
economics literatures. I use a simple framework that incorporates various bits and pieces 
of classic trade-off, supply and demand as well as more recent agglomeration models. The 
bid-rent world is developed with the primary objective of motivating empirical tests using 
different response variables and making the resulting estimates comparable. The key ele-
ments of this world are residents who derive a utility from the consumption of accessibil-
ity and urbanity and whose utility, through costless mobility, is equalized across locations 
by correspondingly adjusting (per unit) prices of housing space and substitution of hous-
ing and non-housing consumption. Via a housing production function, varying prices 
across locations translate into different land prices and, due to factor substitution, varying 
building densities. Following a similar logic, I assume that accessibility and urbanity as 
two distinct forms of urban agglomeration economies affect total factor productivity and, 
under the equilibrating assumption of zero economic profit, impact on prices of office 
space and commercial land as well as economic densities.  
Housing demand 
I assume a very simplistic world where identical and mobile individuals at location x in a 
linear city derive a Cobb-Douglas utility from the consumption of a composite non-housing 
consumption good C, living space S(x), accessibility A(x) and urbanity Z(x).  
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 ( )     ( )  ( )  ( )1         (1) 
 ( ) is an index of accessibility to the overall economic mass, proxied by the distribution 
of workplace employment.  
 ( )  ∫ 1( ) e
  1 (  )d    (2) 
Note that this world follows the spirit of Alonso (1964) in that individuals have direct 
preference on labor market accessibility. Such direct preferences on accessibility can re-
sult from inconvenience of traveling and the desire to locate centrally within a pool of em-
ployment opportunities and correlated services. To simplify matters I assume that, in 
monetary terms, within a city transport costs do not vary depending on the place or resi-
dence (x). This assumption does not imply that monetary transport costs are irrelevant: 
they may still represent a substantial share of the budget. Instead the idea is that the loca-
tion varying component is relatively small compared to the fixed cost, e.g., of owning a car, 
or using public transport, where an increase in distance traveled in practice, if at all, only 
leads to a marginal increase in monetary transport cost. Minimally, the implication is that 
the marginal increase in monetary cost in distance traveled is small relative to the incon-
venience of longer journeys, which seems like a reasonable approximation for many large 
metropolitan areas, including Berlin and London.  
In the same way, an index of urbanity can be described, where densities refer to the distri-
bution of aesthetic amenities and specialized consumption varieties that come in excess to 
benefits that can be ascribed to labor market accessibility.  
 ( )  ∫  ( )  
    (  )     (3) 
Households take accessibility and urbanity as given and spend their exogenous budget 
(net of monetary transport costs) B on living space, with an associated price or bid-rent of 
 ( ) for one unit of space S(x) and the composite consumption good whose price is the 
numeraire. First order conditions imply following indirect demand functions:  
  
 
   
    (4a) 
 ( )  
 
   
 
 ( )
  (4b) 
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Perfect mobility implies that utility is equalized across all locations. Prices bid for living 
space, which are the equilibrating factor, make individuals indifferent across locations. 
 ( )   ̅  (
 
   
 )
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 ( )
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 ( )  ( )          (5) 
Setting  ̅ to 1 for simplicity and solving for  ( ) yields equilibrium rents as a function of 
accessibility and urbanity. 
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  ( )
       
    (6) 
Taking logs lays the foundations for a reduced form empirical specification. Given the usu-
al parameter restrictions, i.e. α, β, γ > 0 and α+β+γ<1,  bid-rents must increase in accessi-
bility and urbanity. 
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   (∫   ( )  
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   (∫   ( )  
    (  )  )  (7) 
Housing Supply 
Equation (7), within the constraints of assumptions made, reflects the demand for housing 
space in the urban economy. There is, of course, a supply side that needs to be considered 
to understand the spatial equilibrium of a city as housing supply, even with strong regula-
tory constraints and limits to densification, is not perfectly inelastic. Very much in the spir-
it of classic models (Mills, 1972; Muth, 1969), housing is provided by a homogenous con-
struction sector that uses capital (K) and land (L) as inputs in a concave production func-
tion, which for simplicity I assume to take the Cobb-Douglas form.  
 ( )  
 
 ( )
          (8) 
where      and   is a measure of regulatory restrictiveness that makes the production 
technology less efficient. This is an important extension as some of the amenities consid-
ered in the demand side are, at least partially, an outcome of a regulatory process. Herit-
age preservation policy that protects buildings with an inherent aesthetic or historic value 
is a typical example.  
Construction firms pay a bid-rent for land  ( ) while the price of capital, which is a com-
posite of all non-land inputs, is the numeraire. The first order conditions yield the follow-
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ing demand for capital. Land, at a given location x is assumed to be fixed and provided ine-
lasticly. 
  
( ̅)
 
 
   
 ( )   (9) 
As markets are competitive with full entry and exit, housing is traded at a market price, 
the housing bid-rent ( ), and construction firms make zero profits. 
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 ( )
(
 
   
 ( ) )
 
     
 
   
 ( )   ( )     (10) 
The equilibrium land rent is thus determined by the housing bid-rent and the level of 
regulatory restrictiveness at location x.   
 ( )   ( )
 
   (   )   ( ) 
 
      (11) 
Substituting the equation (6) into (11) yields the residential land market equilibrium con-
dition.  
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Taking logarithms, this equation similar to equation (7) lays the foundation for an empiri-
cal test. 7  
log( (x))    
 
(1  )
log( (x))  
  
 
(1  ) 
log(∫  1( ) e
  1 (  )d )   
1      
(1  ) 
log(∫   ( )  
    (  )  ) (13) 
Given the usual parameter restrictions, land rents must increase in accessibility and ur-
banity and decline with tighter regulations. In reality, however, property owners are often 
compensated for the cost of regulation. A typical example are tax benefits or renovation 
subsidies in case of restriction of property rights in the realm of preservation policies, 
which makes price effects less clear a priori in practice. 
                                                             
7  Where   [(   )   
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].  
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Due to the scarcity of land at a given location, the unit value of land net of building struc-
ture  ( ) is an appealing basis for an empirical test of bid-rent models. Such pure land 
values, however, can often not be observed directly, except in the case of vacant land that 
comes with the limitation of normally being vacant for reasons. Where assessed land val-
ues are available, as in the case of Berlin, their assessment by experts is often not fully 
transparent. It can be demonstrated, however, that within the constraints of the assump-
tions made, the total value of housing space ( ( ) ( )) per land unit L is a linear trans-
formation of the pure land value. In an empirical specification, this ratio can be approxi-
mated by the ratio of the selling price of a property to the size of the corresponding plot of 
land. Compared to the use of pure land values, the coefficient interpretation in a log-
linearized empirical specification will not be affected. 
 ( ) ( )
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1  
 ( )   ( )  
1
1  
 ( )  (14) 
Bid-rents that vary across locations trigger a number of subsequent implications for vari-
ous density measures that can be tested with the appropriate data at hand. As with the 
price per land area, the capital to land ratio derived in equation (9) can be shown to be a 
linear transformation of the land rent. Empirically, it can be approximated by the ratio of 
the property price net of land value to the area of the respective plot of land.  
  
( ̅)
 
 ( ) ( )  ( ) 
 
 
 
1  
 ( )    (15) 
Another particularly interesting measure that can be used to test the implications of the 
model is the so-called floor space index, the ratio of housing space to the corresponding 
plot of land. It can be shown that housing space H(x) per land unit L follows the same de-
terminants as the land rent, albeit it is not a linear transformation. Even though the floor 
space index has the neat feature of being presumably less sensitive to unobserved housing 
quality, this variable has enjoyed relatively limited popularity as a basis for empirical tests 
of bid-rent models. 
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1  
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    ( ) 
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1    (16) 
Another density measure that can directly be derived from equation (9) is the inverse of 
the individual space consumption, which corresponds to the ratio of the total number of 
residents (POP) to total housing space at a given location and is a linear transformation of 
the housing bid-rent. 
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Multiplying this measure by building density (H/L) yields an implication for the number of 
inhabitants per land unit, which in turn is a linear transformation of the land bid-rent 
function.  
1
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 ( )    (18) 
Commerce 
For the commercial sector, I assume a world where agglomeration economies shift the 
total factor productivity of homogenous firms that produce a composite good or service 
(T) with constant returns to scale using labor (N) and (office) space (S) as input factors. I 
distinguish between two forms of urban agglomeration economies that enter the produc-
tion function in the usual multiplicative form: First, a human capital externality derived 
from proximity to neighboring firms and the associated information and communication 
flows. Second, an urbanity externality related to attractive and interesting places that 
shifts the productivity of a firm because of the benefits associated with a more prestigious 
address, the image effects of co-location with well-known buildings or urban spaces as 
well as direct productivity effects related to the ease of attracting more motivated or quali-
fied workers to more attractive locations. Setting the price of labor as the numeraire, per-
fect competition and zero economic profits imply that the following condition must hold at 
all commercial locations x across the city.  
 ( )  ( )    ( )1    ( ) ( )       (19) 
where A(x) as described in (2) is an employment potentiality and Z(x) is the urbanity po-
tential defined analogically to (3).  ( ), as before, is the rent that is bid for one unit of 
space so to equilibrate (zero) profits. Profit maximizing behavior implies: 
1  
 
 
 ( )
  ( )   (20) 
Commercial bid-rents must adjust to equilibrate the productivity effects of agglomeration 
benefits. Combining (19) and (20) and solving for  ( ) we obtain the equilibrium condi-
tion for the (office) space bid-rent. 
 ( )   
1
1   ( )
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1     (21) 
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Assuming the same construction technology as in the housing sector, the commercial land 
rent condition takes the following form. 
 (x)  (1  )   
1
1   ( ) 
1
1   ( )
 
(1  )(1  ) ( )
 
(1  )(1  )  (22) 
As for the residential sector, we can derive a series of additional implications for the price 
to land ratio, capital to land ratio, the floor space ratio and the employment per space and 
land densities. 
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This simple, but broad set of theoretical implications can be used to set up a battery of 
reduced form empirical tests whose design and interpretability I discuss in the next sec-
tion. 
3.2   Empirical Strategy 
The empirical strategy builds on separate reduced form tests of the equilibrium conditions 
derived above to back out the effects of accessibility and urbanity on household utility, 
firm productivity and the spatial structure of cities. Therefore, it is essential to find empir-
ical correspondences to A(x) and Z(x) defined in equations (2) and (3). The main objective 
is to establish an empirical link between a rent or density measure at location i and densi-
ties of economic activity and urbanity at all other locations j, weighted by distance. I estab-
lish this link through a so-called potentiality or gravity equation, which has recently 
gained popularity in the applied urban economics and house price capitalization literature 
(e.g. Ahlfeldt, 2011b; Cervero, Rood, & Appleyard, 1999; Osland & Thorsen, 2008). 
     ∑    
      
    (28) 
where POT is a potentiality measure at location i, w is a weight measure corresponding to 
the densities in equations (2) and (3), T is the decay parameter and Dij the bilateral 
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straight line distance between two locations i and j in the city in km units. If not referring 
to virtually dimensionless addresses or photo coordinates, distances will connect to areas 
based on the locations of their geographic centroids.  
The most important potentialities are created to capture access to economic mass and 
what I referred to as urbanity in the section above. For the former, I set wj in (28) to the 
share of workplace employment at total city employment at location j in a representative 
year (2003 for Berlin, 2001 for London). The urbanity weight follows the definition in (1), 
that is, photos are weighted by the total number of pictures taken in a given year 
(
1
 
∑
    
  
 ). Four more potentiality variables will be defined capturing the endowment with 
1) contemporary and 2) historic landmark architecture, 3) mainstream and 4) avant-garde 
cultural facilities. For 1) and 4), I simply set wj to the inverse of the total number of land-
marks and music nodes. I define wj for 2) in the same way for the case of London, whereas 
the share at the total building footprint covered by heritage listed buildings will be used in 
the case of Berlin. For 3), theaters, museums, movie theaters and event spaces receive 
weights according to the inverse of the number of facilities in each category.  
The virtue of a photo potentiality defined according to equation (28) is that we can proxy 
the composite good "urbanity" with one single variable. One limitation of this approach is 
that there is only an indirect connection between the perceived level of urbanity and the 
density of photos taken. Photo activity in some sense may be viewed as the outcome of a 
production function where the features u that jointly constitute urbanity are the input 
factors.  
      ∏       
  
    (29) 
where PPOT and UPOTu are potentiality variables as defined in (28) capturing the spatial 
distribution of photos (PPOT) and the urbanity features (1–4) discussed above. It is entire-
ly possible that there are increasing or decreasing returns to urbanity in the photo produc-
tion function, depending on ∑       so that changes in the photo potentiality may over-
state or understate effective urbanity levels. 
To bring the photo potentiality measure into the scale of observable urbanity features, I 
first estimate the production function in log-linearized form and then rescale the (log) 
photo potentiality variable to an index (PI) that matches a constant returns to scale output 
of the observed amenity features  (∑      ), assuming these are representative in these 
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terms for all elements of urbanity. Since this is a log-linear transformation it will affect the 
magnitude of the coefficient estimates, but not the models fit of the log-linear empirical 
specifications I use. 
log(     )    ∑                (30) 
log(   )  
log (∑    
      
 )
∑  ̂  
    (31) 
With the employment and adjusted photo potentialities at hand, a simple empirical speci-
fication can be set up that serves as a basis for a battery of reduced form tests of equations 
(7), (12–18) and (21–27). 
log(  )         (∑   
    
     
 )       (∑   
    
     
 )          (32) 
where Y is one of the rent and density measures listed in Table (5), Xi  is a vector of control 
variables, a, b, c, TE, and TP are parameters to be estimated and B is a parameter vector. 
Equation (32) is evidently non-linear, which imposes some challenges to the estimation of 
the parameters, especially the decay parameters. To solve the equation at the maximum 
spatial detail with hundreds of thousands (up to 1.8 million) of photo weights and distanc-
es on the right-hand side, I conduct a grid search over all combinations of parameter val-
ues                                     . Therefore, I generate potentiality 
measures for all considered decay parameters before I run separate linearized OLS regres-
sions and choose the R2 maximizing combination with the only parameter restriction be-
ing that b, c > 0. Beforehand, I adjust the photo potentiality as discussed above for all val-
ues of   . Irrespectively of how equation (32) is solved, it is important to note that there is 
an interdependency of the level and decay parameters in the potentiality variables. Lower 
decay parameters imply a stronger spatial smoothing, reduce the variance of the potential-
ity measure and normally produce higher level coefficients. An advantage of the potentiali-
ty approach is that even in light of a high spatial correlation of the data (e.g. photo and 
employment densities), the underlying economic phenomena can be empirically distin-
guishable if they operate with different spatial scope and if different decay parameters 
apply.  
With two potentiality variables based on spatially correlated data, the identification of the 
appropriate combination of level and decay parameters becomes particularly challenging 
and there is a risk that the distinct decay parameters are identified appropriately, but as-
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signed to the wrong variable. If the true decay parameters were known, this problem 
could be circumvented by fixing the parameters and estimating a linearized version of 
equation (32). While I don't know the exact spatial scope of accessibility and urbanity a 
priori and need to indentify the decay parameters empirically, I have some priors regard-
ing their relative size. I define urbanity to be constituted by the endowment with aesthetic 
and consumption amenities that a neighborhood has to offer, which is presumably a very 
local phenomenon. Similarly, information spillovers that enhance the productivity of firms 
critically depend on close co-location that enhances physical contacts among workers. In 
contrast, access to employment opportunities for households means current or potential 
reductions in commuting, which occurs over significantly larger distances. This implies a 
relatively smaller decay parameter in the respective potentiality and any parameter com-
bination will have to pass this "sniff test" to be plausible.  
I estimate three versions of equation (32). First, a pure version where the only location 
attributes are the accessibility and urbanity potentialities and the vector X only contains 
property attributes. Second, an extended version with other location features that do not 
fall into the abovementioned urbanity categories. Third, a further extended specification 
that contains the observable urbanity features to decompose the urbanity effect into a 
component that can be observed directly and a component that is otherwise unobservable 
but captured by the revealed preference approach.  
A key element of the empirical strategy is to test the implications of the bid-rent world 
based on a variety of response variables Y. Table 5 gives an overview of the considered 
measures and how the structural parameters can be identified from the reduced form es-
timates. Evidently, a number of parameters must be known to infer on the structural elas-
ticity parameters from the coefficient estimates, namely α, ω and δ. Evidence suggests that 
the income share spent on housing (1-α) is relatively stable and can be set to 32% (Davis 
& Ortalo-Magné, 2011; Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, & Owens, 2010). Less research has gone 
into the output elasticity of labor in an equation (19) type production function. Cheshire, 
Hilber & Kaplanis (2011), estimating a retail productivity equation, provide compelling 
evidence that a value of 1- ω=0.85 may be a plausible approximation. Although it is not 
entirely clear to which degree this value generalizes to other commercial sectors, it is no-
table that their estimates are close to the respective parameter values used in the quanti-
tative Analyses by Lucas & Rossi-Hansberg (2002). While I have to borrow α and ω from 
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the literature, it is, with the data at hand, possible to estimate δ, at least in the case of Ber-
lin. As demonstrated in the appendix, the output elasticity of land (1-δ) falls into the range 
of 0.42 for residential properties and 0.45 for commercial properties (Table A2), which is 
somewhat larger than suggested by the conventional rule of thumb that the value of the 
building structure should be twice the value of the underlying land.  
With these parameters at hand, the structural parameters of the model can be derived 
from the estimation coefficients. At some stages of the empirical analysis, however, a 
number of issues arise, three of which I attach particular attention.  
FSI Regressions 
With few exceptions (e.g. McMillen, 2007), the floor space index has enjoyed relatively 
little popularity as a basis for empirical tests of bid-rent models despite the very interest-
ing insights it has to offer. For one thing, this variable is less evidently correlated with un-
observed housing quality, which can greatly influence selling prices of properties and pose 
a substantial challenge to any MWTP estimate derived from house price regressions. For 
another thing, acknowledging that cities are not perfectly malleable, the investigation of 
floor to land area ratios of buildings constructed at different times at comparable locations 
offers a way to explore the visible traces of the past with contemporary data. At least in 
European cities, with large historic building stocks that have remained structurally un-
changed and preserved over time, building densities mainly reflect the economic funda-
mentals, i.e., preferences, construction technologies, and regulatory regimes of the times 
when they were constructed. While I argue that the careful analysis of building densities 
potentially opens a universe of opportunities to explore the spatio-temporal structure of 
cities in further research, I leave it to a simple and straightforward model extension in this 
contribution for the sake of brevity. To distinguish between contemporary and historic 
effects reflected by the current FSI ratios I include interactive terms of the (potentiality) 
variables of interest and a yearly trend variable with the zero value referring to 1800. 
With this simple extension, it is possible to distinguish the structural interpretation of 
parameters into a historic (1800) and a contemporary (2009) scenario. 
Gentrification 
Another matter arises when running house price regressions on observable urbanity fea-
tures. In an urban context, many features are not strictly exogenous, but the relationship is 
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particularly interdependent between property prices and music nodes. A large body of 
gentrification literature discusses how young, creative professionals settle in cheap run-
down downtown areas and open avant-garde establishments alike to the considered mu-
sic nodes. This qualitatively well-documented, but quantitatively less explored process 
changes the character of the neighborhood, attracts higher-income households and even-
tually leads to appreciation (Ahlfeldt, 2011a; Clay, 1979), which is an implication that is 
easy to test in regression house price capitalization models. Therefore, I consider an inter-
active term of the music node variable with a trend variable defined similar to the trend 
variable in the FSI regressions, with the only difference being that the zero value is set to 
the year 2000. This interactive term should capture any relative increase in prices close to 
these facilities over time, which would be in line with the abovementioned gentrification 
phenomenon. 
Residential Sorting 
In the simple bid-rent world outlined above, I have implicitly assumed residents to be ho-
mogenous. In reality, however, residents are evidently heterogeneous and are likely to 
differ in their tastes and preferences for physical housing space, accessibility and urbanity, 
i.e. β, γ, and 1-α-β-γ. Such heterogeneous preferences should lead to residential sorting 
with residents that exhibit stronger preferences for either accessibility or urbanity being 
more likely to live in neighborhoods with a favorable endowment. Such residential sorting 
may lead to non-linear, usually convex price gradients, which are the envelope of individ-
ual bid-rent curves. In the last step of the empirical analyses, I therefore investigate the 
slope of the price gradients, which should reflect the utility functions of the local popula-
tion over various levels of accessibility and urbanity in a non-parametric analysis.  
I proceed with the following strategy. First, I estimate a semi-parametric version of equa-
tion (32). 
log(  )   (   )   (   )            (33) 
where EP and PI are the employment potentiality and the photo potentiality index dis-
cussed above, with decay parameters TE and TP fixed to the values identified in the grid 
search. To estimate the true non-linear partial correlations conditional on the vector of 
control variables X, I first run an auxiliary regression the following type: 
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log(  )        ∑        ∑             (34) 
where DEPq and DPIq are sets of dummy variables for one percentile bins (q) of EP and PI. I 
then create the adjusted log prices (log( ̂ )-   )  and use them in a lowess smoothing re-
gression with multiple predictors to estimate the unknown non-linear functions f(.) and 
g(.).8 Based on the first derivatives at all transactions i, I estimate local shares of expendi-
tures on accessibility   (   )⁄  and urbanity (       ) (   )⁄  at housing con-
sumption and regress them on the accessibility and urbanity measures, plus population 
composition attributes in separate regressions.9 I consider four household attributes, the 
average income (INC) and AGE of the resident population as well as a proxy for the local 
composition by ethnicity (London) or citizenship (Berlin) (FOR) and a proxy for education 
and qualification (UC). For London I use the qualification index based on 2001 census es-
timates introduced in section 2. For Berlin, the best proxy I can get is the share of votes for 
the upscale parties FDP/Liberals and Die Grünen/Greens, whose conditional effect (on age 
and income) following the argumentation from section 2 should serve as a rude proxy for 
the local education level. 
  
(   )
 
(   )  
 
  (   )(  
    
 )
                                        (35a) 
(       ) 
(   )
 
(   )  
 
  (   )(  
    
 )
                                         (35b) 
I use these final empirical specifications to reveal trends in the estimated elasticity param-
eters over different levels of accessibility and urbanity, the impact of the local population 
composition and, ultimately, to which degree the population composition explains observ-
able non-linearities, which I interpret as evidence for the presence of residential sorting.  
3.3   Empirical Analysis 
Utility Effects  
I start the presentation and discussion of empirical results with the Berlin baseline esti-
mates depicted in Table 6. Note that the set of hedonic controls does not include location 
                                                             
8  The methodology of the employed estimator relies on the generalized additive models discussed 
by Hastie & Tibshirani, 1990 (1990). 
9  The first derivatives of the non-linear functions are approximated by the linear fit to a 1% 
sample centered around each observation i.  
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variables, but is limited to structural characteristics. Time Effects are a set of yearly dum-
my variables controlling for macro shocks during the observation period (2000–2009) 
that are common to each of the study areas. The interaction effects (Time x East) interact 
the year dummies with a dummy variable denoting transactions occurring within former 
East-Berlin to allow for a price differential between the formerly separated parts of the 
city that varies over time and capture potential convergence processes. It is also notable 
that throughout the paper, hedonic controls exclude variables referring either to floor 
space or land area as space consumption and housing densities are endogenous in the 
model world and built into the equilibrium conditions. For the same reasons, I also ex-
clude variables denoting building types that are correlated with building densities except 
for the price to floor space regressions which focus on the internal usage of buildings only. 
All locational and non-locational control variables used in the models are tabulated in Ta-
ble A2 in the appendix. To save space I do not present hedonic estimates in the main ta-
bles. Full estimation results are presented for selected models in the appendix (Table A3).  
Table 6 starts with models (1–3) where the spatial decay parameters are identified in 
grid-searches for the employment potentiality (1) and the photo potentiality (2) separa-
tely as well as and jointly (3). When estimated jointly, the photo potentiality decay in the 
R2 maximizing model is steep compared to the employment potentiality, indicating a lo-
calized effect of urbanity compared to a more general labor market accessibility effect (3). 
This spatial decay parameter is close to the one found by Ahlfeldt & Maennig (2010b) who 
investigate the external effects of heritage listed buildings on the property prices of sur-
rounding buildings. 
In model (2), where the photo potentiality is the sole location variable, the relatively small 
decay parameter in conjunction with a relatively large level parameter indicate that the 
variable absorbs correlated accessibility effects. Similarly, the results suggest that the pure 
employment potentiality model confounds the employment accessibility and urbanity 
effects, leading to an upward bias of about 30% when comparing models (1) and (3). The 
decay parameters from the preferred specification (3) are presented in Figure 4. The re-
sults of the grid search in terms of R2 are illustrated in the left panel of in Figure (5). They 
suggest that the identified parameter combination is a relatively stable configuration as no 
multiple peaks are evident on the surface. The results from columns (1) to (3) indicate 
that there is a significant bias if either of the effects is not controlled for efficiently. Mini-
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mally, the results from standard models without urbanity controls should be interpreted 
carefully, taking into account that in many urban environments any accessibility variable 
will reflect urbanity effects in addition to labor market effects.  
Regarding the implied structural model parameters, Table 6 draws a generally compre-
hensive picture. The parameters of interest are estimated at high levels of statistical signif-
icance in almost all models. Even though based on very distinct dependent variables, the 
implied structural parameters are generally consistent. The structural parameters listed in 
the bottom of the table imply that a doubling in accessibility increases household utility by 
about 3–3.5% (γ). A similar increase in urbanity increases utility by 0.3–0.35% (1-α-β-γ). 
Interpreting these parameters as expenditure shares and expressing them relative to the 
share of expenditure on housing consumption including accessibility and urbanity (1-α), I 
conclude that about 10% (1%) of total expenditures into housing are paid to enjoy the 
benefits of accessibility (urbanity).  
These parameters suggest that residents attach a much higher value to a centrality with 
respect to the economic mass of the city than to less tangible benefits of urbanity when 
purchasing living space. Partially because of the steeper decay, however, there is a signifi-
cantly larger variation in the photo potentiality than in the employment potentiality across 
the city, implying that differences in the consumption of urbanity across the city area are 
significantly larger. For the spatial structure of the city, therefore, the quantitative rele-
vance of accessibility and urbanity are within a more similar range. Moving from the 1st to 
the 99th percentile location in terms of accessibility (urbanity) increases the equilibrium 
land rent by about 85–90% (55–70%) according to the preferred estimates (3, 6, 8, 9). In 
terms of rents paid for housing space these changes imply adjustments of about 38–40% 
(25–31%.) Following equation (4b), such a change in the price of living space induces a 
substitution effect that should lead to a reduction in the per capita consumption of housing 
space by about 27–29% (20–24%). A particularly reassuring feature of these results is 
that the implied adjustment in per capita space consumption derived from property prices 
(3), capital to land ratios (6) and even land values (5) and floor space indices (8) are re-
markably close to the estimates based on block level population per housing space (9).  
There are two exceptions to the generally consistent pattern in Table 6. First, the property 
price per floor space regressions (4) produce very small accessibility and urbanity effects. 
One explanation could be unobserved housing quality that is negatively correlated with 
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centrality (typically older parts of the city) and affects the price per square meter floor 
space more severely than the price per land unit. This explanation is supported by the fact 
that the introduction of residential characteristics, especially local income levels that 
should capture correlated housing quality, remedies the problem to some degree (see Ta-
ble 7). A phenomenon that is in line with previous evidence (Ahlfeldt, 2011b). Second, the 
baseline floor space index (FSI) regression yields utility effects that are quite far off from 
the other variables (7) into the opposite direction, especially regarding accessibility. As 
discussed in the previous sub-section, the results of such an FSI regression need to be in-
terpreted with some care in light of the durability of the building stock. Once the interac-
tion effects of construction year and urbanity, respectively accessibility effects, are al-
lowed for, the implied 2009 structural parameters come down into the range of the other 
estimates (8). The implied 18   accessibility share parameter (γ) instead turns out to be 
more than three times as high as in 2009 (10.84%). Such a discrepancy between historic 
and contemporary effects might be partially explainable with a transportation technology 
that has improved over time and has made the economic centrality of a location less im-
portant in the presence of individual and public rapid transport. In that sense, these con-
temporary FSI regressions confirm the existing evidence of a declining value of accessibil-
ity available from studies that have looked at land values over time (e.g. Ahlfeldt & 
Wendland, 2011; McMillen, 1996). Notably, the population density regression (10) pro-
duces almost exactly the same structural parameters as the baseline FSI regressions (7), 
which is plausible given that the density of the current building stock, no matter what his-
toric circumstances it results from, is a key determinant of the current population density.  
The estimated hedonic parameters for the internal structural characteristics offer general-
ly little surprise (see Table A3). Since these do not stand in the focus of this analysis, I will 
skip a lengthy discussion. One variable, however, is particularly interesting in the context 
of the model: the heritage designation status of a property. As discussed above, the model 
predicts regulatory constraints that increase the construction/maintenance costs of hous-
ing space to reduce land rents, capital to land ratios and building densities measured in 
terms of the FSI. At the same time, these policies come with sizable benefits to own-
ers/buyers in the form of tax abatements and renovation subsidies. Designation status is 
also likely correlated with, if not causally related in either direction, to housing quality. 
The direction of the effect, thus, becomes mainly an empirical issue into which Table 6 
results provide some interesting insights. Accordingly, there is a) no significant impact on 
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the land rent, b) a significantly positive effect on the housing rent and c) a significantly 
negative effect on the FSI. One interpretation of these findings is that the higher housing 
bid-rents reflect higher, unobserved housing quality. The significantly negative effects on 
the FSI likely reflect the effects of restrictions that largely prohibit amendments and ex-
tensions of listed buildings. Both effects in conjunction with compensation policies tend to 
cancel out each other in their effects on the land rent. 
The “pure” models in Table 6 feature the employment and the photo potentialities as ex-
clusive locational variables. As I argue, the photo potentiality is a revealed preference indi-
cator for attractive spaces which allows capturing empirically what is otherwise difficult 
to observe. Of course, other more common variables also capture an endowment with at-
tractive features that are correlated with, if not part of, urbanity. It is therefore an im-
portant empirical question to which degree the revealed preference indicator really cap-
tures otherwise unobservable variation in locational quality. To disentangle this otherwise 
unobservable from a directly observable part, I estimate the urbanity effects conditional 
on observable features in Table 7 based on the two variables that are at the very core of 
the bid-rent model, i.e., prices per units of land and floor space. While for the sake of com-
pleteness I attach the implied model parameters in Table 7 – they should be interpreted 
with some care. Given that the controls included are strong in the sense that they capture 
urbanity in parts, lower residual effects of the urbanity variable should be interpreted as 
evidence for the strength of the controls rather than limited relevance of urbanity per se.  
Column (1) suggests that the introduction of what can reasonably be described as strong 
controls used in house prize capitalization studies brings down the urbanity effect by 
about 40%.10 In contrast, the estimated accessibility effect hardly changes. Further ex-
panding the set of controls to include explicit urbanity features, that is, architectural and 
cultural potentialities (2), reduces the residual urbanity effect by some additional percent-
age points to about 50% compared to the benchmark (Table 6, column 3). The respective 
potentiality variables are generated using the urbanity decay parameter. The accessibility 
effect comes down somewhat, too, indicating that the employment potentiality had to 
                                                             
10  The vector of control variables controls for spatial trends along the x- and y- coordinates, dis-
tance to the nearest park, water body, main street and station, the local noise level measured in 
db as well as shares of non-Germans and several age groups (<6, 6–18, 18–27,45–55,55–65,>65) 
at the total population and a GfK estimate of the local purchasing power per capita.  
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some degree captured amenity effects of these features. To conclude this exercise, at least 
50% of the urbanity effect captured by the revealed preference indicator come in addition 
to what we can capture with a rich set of locational control variables. Hence, the revealed 
preference variable has something to add empirically, making this approach a promising 
avenue for further research. As in Table 6, the price per floor space regressions draw a 
somewhat different picture. The introduction of the location and neighborhood controls 
substantially increases the estimated accessibility and urbanity effects. One possible ex-
planation, as previously discussed, is that the neighborhood effects pick up unobserved 
housing quality that had previously confounded the estimates. The introduction of the 
urbanity features reduces both accessibility and urbanity effects by about 40% compared 
to the benchmark in Table 6.  
It is difficult to interpret the coefficients of the architectural and cultural variables intro-
duced in models (2) and (4) in light of the various spatial measures that compete for the 
urbanity related variation, especially the spatial trends (X/Y-coordinates) and the photo 
potentiality. However, as discussed in the section above, it is especially interesting to look 
at the (relative) price trends in proximity to the music nodes in light of the suspected gen-
trification processes. Indeed, as reflected by the significantly positive coefficient on the 
interactive term in model (5), prices appreciated significantly faster over the observation 
period (2000–2009) in neighborhoods with a high concentration of such avant-garde cul-
tural facilities. Another interesting result is the consistently positive effect of the heritage 
potentiality variable, reflecting a positive willingness to pay for co-location with heritage 
listed buildings. Together with the non-negative internal price effects revealed in Tables 
(5–6), this finding indicates that the current practice of heritage preservation policy in 
Berlin benefits neighboring property owners without harming those who own a listed 
building. While this combination points to potentially welfare enhancing effects, these 
need to be weighed against the significant constraints on housing supply suggested by the 
FSI regressions in Table 6. If the latter dominates and these policies substantially hinder 
construction activity to keep up with increasing demand, a supply driven increase in prop-
erty prices would be the result, which could lead to affordability problems in the long run 
(Hilber & Vermeulen, 2010).  
Within the constraints of data availability, I replicate a number of Table 5 and 6 models for 
London, using the log price per square meter floor space as a dependent variable. Despite 
29
the distinct dependent variables, columns (1) and (2) show similar results to same col-
umns in Table 6. First, the grid searches yield a similar decay parameter for the employ-
ment potentiality (0.7 vs. 0.9, column 1) and the same value for the photo potentiality (1, 
column 2). This is particularly encouraging as it suggests that these variables capture 
some general and important spatial phenomena. Second, assuming the critical parameter 
in the housing construction function (δ) generalizes from Berlin to London, the critical 
accessibility and urbanity parameters as well as the implied effects on the spatial structure 
are within a similar range in both cities. Once a grid search is run over all parameter com-
binations of decay parameters in the accessibility and urbanity variable, the results differ 
substantially from those for Berlin. As illustrated in Figure 6, the grid search suggests an 
R2 maximizing parameter combination with a relatively strong decay in the employment 
accessibility variable (4) and a much lower decay in the photo potentiality (1) (column, 3). 
This would be a world where urbanity clearly dominates accessibility in terms of utility 
effects and as a determinant of the spatial structure of the city. As discussed above, it is 
ambitious to empirically identify the decay parameters in light of the relatively strong spa-
tial correlation of employment and photo densities so that the critical assessment of the 
results seems warranted at all stages. This combination clearly runs counter to plausibility 
considerations that dictate the effects of urbanity to be more local in scope than those of 
labor market accessibility. Assuming that these results successfully distinguish the two 
spatial phenomena with distinct range, but confound the underlying data (employment 
and photo densities) due the strong spatial correlation (see Figure 3), I flip the decay pa-
rameter to match variables (employment and photo potentialities), economic phenomena 
(accessibility, urbanity) and decay (wide, narrow) in a plausible way (column 4). In this 
specification, accessibility and urbanity effects are much closer to the Berlin results. Dou-
bling accessibility (urbanity) increases utility by about 2.2% (0.3%). The implied shares at 
housing expenditures amount to about 6.9% (0.9%). Even in this more careful specifica-
tion (compared to column 3), urbanity is an important determinant of city structure. The 
introduction of the urbanity variable (4) reduces the magnitude of the accessibility pa-
rameters by more than 50% (compared to column 1). The quantitative effects on prices at 
different locations (moving from the 1st to the 99th percentile) are even larger for the 
urbanity than for the accessibility variable (51% vs. 24% in terms of housing rent).  
In columns (5–6), additional location control variables are added to the model following 
the procedure in Table 7. Column (5) adds a range of location and neighborhood controls, 
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which increase accessibility at the expense of urbanity effects. Regarding the effects on the 
spatial structure, the inclusion of these variables brings the residual urbanity effect cap-
tured by the photo potentiality down by about one half. Again, the reduction does not nec-
essarily imply that the urbanity effects are biased in model (4), but that the spatial varia-
bles do a relatively good job in capturing amenities that concentrate in some areas more 
than in others. The introduction of variables that capture urbanity features further brings 
down the photo potentiality coefficient. Still, about 30% of the urbanity effects captured 
by the revealed preference variable remain otherwise unobservable. Also, it’s notable that 
the reduction in the (residual) urbanity effect is largely driven by the introduction of 
neighborhood controls, especially income, which are typically problematic due to endo-
gineity issues. Finally, the interaction effect of the music node potentiality and a time trend 
again points to a more rapid appreciation in the vicinity of avant-garde cultural faculties, 
which is in line with the theories and anecdotal evidence known from the gentrification 
literature.  
Productivity Effects 
Equation (32) also serves as a starting point for a battery of reduced from estimates based 
on distinct dependent variables to infer on total factor productivity effects of good access 
to co-located employment and favorable "urbanity" endowment. Table 9 shows the results 
from “pure” models with no other location controls than the employment spillover varia-
ble and the photo potentiality. The structural interpretation of the agglomeration parame-
ters of interest as well as the implied effects on the spatial structure of land rents, office 
space prices as well as space per employee are attached at the bottom of the Table. Again, 
the variables of interest are estimated at high levels of statistical significance. The implied 
structural parameters are by and large consistent across specifications, and even more 
stable than in the residential models. In particular, the price per floor space (4) and the FSI 
(7) regressions yield estimates that are within a reasonable range compared to the other 
estimates. The most notable exception is the employment per land area regression (10), 
which produces an employment spillover effect that is several orders of magnitude higher 
than in any other model. Even though I instrument the employment potential using dis-
tance to the CBD in a 2SLS procedure, the large estimate of the spillover parameter should 
be interpreted with care in light of the mechanical relationship between employment 
shares that appear on both sides of the equation. 
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The estimates in the first model, using the employment spillover variable only, suggest a 
roughly 4% effect on TFP for a doubling in effective access to local workforce (1). As in the 
residential models, the effect comes down once the photo potentiality is introduced (3), 
implying that different forms of agglomeration economies are present and the pure infor-
mation spillover effect may be overstated if urbanity effects are not accounted for. The 
models featuring both variables suggest significantly larger spillover than urbanity effects. 
The spillover elasticity parameter ranges between 2–3% in most of the models while the 
urbanity parameter usually falls into a range of 0.3–0.5%. To some degree, this is related 
to an even stronger spatial decay identified for the urbanity compared to the spillover 
component (see Figure 4). Again, the relatively large variation in urbanity across the city 
translates into an effect on the spatial structure of the city in terms of bid-rents and space 
per employee that is comparable to the spillover effect. As the results from the price per 
land area regressions suggest (3), moving from the 1st to the 99th percentile location in 
terms of employment access (urbanity) yields similar effects in terms of land rent 
(175%/170%), office space rent, (88%/85%) and space occupied per employee (-47%/-
46%). Again, it is particularly reassuring that the effects on occupation of space indirectly 
derived from the property price regressions are roughly in line with the findings of the 
office space regression (9): (-58%/-42%). 
An interesting and maybe somewhat unexpected finding becomes evident from the de-
composition regression in Table 10 where I add locational characteristics to the baseline 
models from Table 9 (columns 3 and 4). The additional controls tend to reduce the spillo-
ver component significantly (up to about 40%), indicating that part of the estimated spill-
over effect can be explained by correlated location characteristics. Still, the spillover pa-
rameter is positive and estimated highly statistically significant. In contrast, the (residual) 
urbanity effect remains stable or even increases, implying that the variable captures some 
very local benefits that are not captured by these variables, for example, the prestige at-
tached to "prime" addresses and public exposure. 
Another important insight can be gained from comparison of the effects accessibility and 
urbanity exhibit on bid-rents of residents and firms. Since both are stronger for firms, we 
expect firms to outbid residents at accessible locations and especially at places with a fa-
vorable urbanity endowment, which will drive economic activity into urban clusters. One 
typical outcome of these forces is the “Mills” map with one dominating business core, sur-
32
rounded by a residential hinterland, although more polycentric configurations are possi-
ble. 
Sorting 
In the analyses so far, a (log) linear approximation of the relationship between various 
dependent variables and the accessibility and urbanity proxies has been assumed to be an 
appropriate functional form. Within the constraints of the model world, which assumes 
homogenous residents (and firms), this is a plausible assumption. In reality, of course, 
heterogeneous preferences should affect residents' willingness to pay for accessibility and 
urbanity so that those with stronger preferences will outbid others at more accessible and 
urban locations. Given that the individual bid-rent curve is determined by the individual 
utility function, and the price gradients we observe are the envelope of all individual bid-
rent functions, such a residential sorting will affect the slope of the gradients at different 
levels of accessibility and urbanity. Putting the argument in the reverse order, I compare 
the slope of the gradients to the composition of the local population to assess the degree to 
which the heterogeneity in the gradients can be explained by differences in the composi-
tion of the local population and to identify which population groups apparently derive a 
particularly large utility from accessibility and urbanity.  
Figure 7 shows non-linear gradient estimates for Berlin based on prices per land area that 
have been adjusted for internal and locational characteristics as described in the empirical 
strategy section (equation 34). Figure 7 confirms that prices tend to generally increase in 
accessibility and urbanity, but also reveals some evident non-linearities. Both gradients 
vacillate between convexity (at lower levels) and concavity (at higher level), but with a 
significantly more pronounced degree of convexity (concavity) for the accessibility (ur-
banity) gradient. The analogical picture for London (Figure 8) similarly shows gradients 
that follow a convex-concave shape, but the convex shape is generally more dominant. At 
very low levels of accessibility prices even tend to decrease in accessibility, before the re-
lationship turns to exhibit the expected positive sign. This negative relationship is difficult 
to explain by residential sorting alone and could reflect some kind of desirable amenity at 
remote locations that is not appropriately accounted for in the empirical models.  
To test whether the differences in the local slopes of the gradients are systematically re-
lated to the composition of the resident population, I recover the first derivatives at each 
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observation and compute the shares of housing expenditure on accessibility and urbanity 
following the procedure described in the empirical strategy and regress them on variables 
that capture the socio-economic composition of the local residents (equations 35 a/b). The 
results are presented in Tables 11 (Berlin) and 12 (London). For each city I regress the 
implied expenditure shares on a potentiality measure (employment or photo) alone and in 
conjunction with the variables capturing the residential composition. To facilitate a 
straightforward comparison standardized beta coefficients are shown. 
For both cities I find a significant degree of convexity in the accessibility gradient as indi-
cated by positive signs on the employment potentiality coefficients in columns (1). Once 
the population composition variables are added (2) the coefficients come down by about 
two thirds (Berlin) to four fifth (London). This pattern is indicative that the convex shape 
in the accessibility gradients is at least partially attributable to residents who derive a 
larger utility from labor market access and correspondingly live in more accessible areas. 
An interesting element in the results is that the presence of highly qualified significantly 
increases the implied expenditure shares on accessibility in both cities, indicating that this 
group derives a particularly large utility from this location feature.  
Regarding the urbanity gradients, I find a negative sign of the photo potentiality coefficient 
in Berlin (Table 11, column 3), which is consistent with Figure 7. One explanation could be 
the presence of a disamenity related to overcrowding by tourists or local visitors at loca-
tions that are enjoyable in terms of aesthetic beauty or other consumption amenities. This 
would create a countervailing externality that could partially cancel out positive utility 
effects. The same gradient for London is evidently convex (Table 12, column 3), which is in 
line with Figure 8 and is the typical expected outcome of sorting processes. The introduc-
tion of the socio-economic controls reduces the photo potentiality coefficients, but less 
than the employment potentiality coefficients. The directions of the effects of the popula-
tion variables are largely consistent across both cities. One interesting finding of the ur-
banity regressions in Tables 11 and 12 is that the rich seem to derive a below average util-
ity from urbanity. The other side of the coin is that the rich have relatively stronger pref-
erences for housing space, especially in Berlin, where the relative utility from accessibility 
also seem to be below average for the wealthy. Another particularly interesting common 
effect is that a larger proportion of highly qualified tends to increase the utility from ur-
banity. This is in line with the descriptive evidence from section 2 which points to signifi-
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cant concentration of the highly qualified in urbanity areas. Even though the used proxies 
for the qualification level are imperfect at best, the consistency in the findings across two 
cities and two fundamental urban location features indicates that a particular preference 
of the high-skilled for central locations with a favorable endowment could be a general 
phenomenon, at least in resurgent dense cities discussed by Glaeser et al. (Glaeser et al., 
2001). 
4 Conclusion 
Cities are more than centers of production. And city centers more than job agglomerations. 
For this analysis, I let people vote with their cameras and find that they clearly choose the 
city centers to be the most attractive areas in Berlin, Germany, and London, UK. Specifical-
ly, I investigate the perceived attractiveness of urban space using a micro level revealed 
preference indicator, which I construct based on a large data set of geo-tagged photos 
shared in web-communities and which is then merged with a rich data set on observable 
location features. As expected, access to jobs, consumption amenities and aesthetic beauty, 
be it man-made or natural, make places more attractive. And even conditional on observa-
ble amenities, central areas are still considerably more attractive than their remote coun-
terparts.  
Merging these data with detailed property transaction data and household characteristics, 
additional insights emerge as individual photo observations can be used to capture other-
wise unobservable dimensions of urbanity. I show that there is a positive and significant 
willingness to pay for urbanity defined along these lines both by residents and firms. In 
terms of the quantitative effects on the spatial structure of cities urbanity turns out to be 
similarly important as labor market accessibility and information spillovers. Moreover, 
urbanity tends to attract the highly qualified – a workforce that is particularly attractive as 
input factor for human capital intensive industries.  
Besides these core results, a number of significant contributions to more or less under 
researched areas emerge from the analysis of this unusually rich micro-level data set. I 
show that structural parameters from a simple bid-rent framework can be consistently 
estimated based on a variety of variables, including prices per land area, land values, capi-
tal to land rations, floor area ratios (FSI) or space occupied by households and workers, 
among others. My results further provide evidence for a significant impact of the built en-
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vironment on perceived attractiveness of urban space, a factor that despite its intuitively 
comprehensive relevance has received limited attention in the economics literature. Posi-
tive effects are found for contemporary landmark architecture but especially for historic 
buildings that are often protected by heritage preservation policies. These positive exter-
nal benefits, however, come at a social cost that adds to the direct monetary compensa-
tions paid to landlords for the restrictions of property rights they suffer. Preservation ef-
forts reduce supply of housing and office space and, thus, (artificially) drive prices and 
potentially induce affordability problems. Another interesting finding relates to the unique 
data set on avant-garde music establishments. I find that their surrounding neighborhoods 
have significantly appreciated over the past decade in Berlin and London. These dynamics 
are in line with gentrification models that view such facilities as catalysts for neighbor-
hood change.  
Finally, the results of this paper shed some light on the fundamental mechanisms that 
drive economic densities and agglomeration. Traditional urban economics models have 
viewed economic activity as being concentrated in the CBD which then attracted residents 
facing commuting costs to their workplace. Against this background, the massive decen-
tralization of production during the 20th century, which has transformed many traditional 
urban economies dominated by a CBD into dispersed metropolitan area clusters, has ques-
tioned the role downtowns may play in the future. This analysis based two amenity cities 
opens a promising avenue: a future as centers of consumption for a highly qualified work-
force, which in turn attracts human capital intense industries.  
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 Figures 
Fig. 1   Distribution of Photo Nodes in Berlin (Top) and London (Bottom) 
 
 
Notes: Own illustration based on Eric Fisher Geotagger’s World Atlas. To improve visibility, a roughly 20% 
(random) sample of all photos is used in these illustrations.  
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Fig. 2   Photo Densities 
Berlin London 
  
  
  
Notes: Maps show photo densities as defined in equation (1) for Berlin (left) and London (right).  
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Fig. 3   Photo Density Distribution in Berlin and London 
Berlin London 
  
  
  
  
Notes: Own illustration. Left (right) illustrations refer to Berlin (London). Dashed lines are linear predic-
tions; solid lines represent the locally weighted regressions fit.   
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Fig. 4   Decay Parameters 
Berlin London 
  
Notes: Decay parameters are identified in separate grid-searches for residential and commercial proper-
ties for Berlin (left). Estimation results are in Table 6, (3) and Table 9, (3). Baseline results for Lon-
don (residential, right) are in Table  8, (4), 
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Fig. 5   Grid Search over Decay Parameters Berlin 
  
Notes: 3D surfaces illustrate R2 (on z-axes) from grid searches on photo potentiality (x-axes) and em-
ployment potentiality (y-axes) decay parameters for residential (left) and commercial (properties).  
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Fig. 6   Grid Search over Decay Parameters London 
 
Notes: 3D surfaces illustrate the R2 (on z-axes) from a grid search on photo potentiality (x-axes) and em-
ployment potentiality (y-axes) decay parameters for residential properties. 
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Fig. 7   MLOWESS Regressions - Berlin 
 
Notes: Graphs show the results of multi-variate lowess regressions of adjusted (log) price/land area on 
(log) Employment and Photo Potentialities using the methodology for generalized additive models 
(Hastie & Tibshirani, 1990). 
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Fig. 8   MLOWESS Regressions - London 
 
Notes: Graphs show the results of multi-variate lowess regressions of adjusted (log) price/floor area on 
(log) Employment and Photo Potentialities using the methodology for generalised additive models 
(Hastie & Tibshirani, 1990). 
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Tables 
Tab. 1   Photos by type and year 
 Berlin   London   
 All Residents Tourists All Residents Tourists 
2002 2,216 672 797 10,043 3,707 3,963 
2003 4,414 1,248 1,591 17,909 5,869 7,654 
2004 9,128 1,443 3,861 39,910 10,995 18,449 
2005 24,335 5,497 9,676 81,840 37,850 24,397 
2006 76,875 21,424 28,204 226,447 110,342 58,297 
2007 135,456 33,774 44,101 427,319 182,256 104,473 
2008 187,859 48,497 49,895 486,999 218,655 109,278 
2009 193,481 52,653 54,908 558,936 237,177 112,587 
Total 633,764 165,208 193,033 1,849,403 806,851 439,098 
Notes: Differences between totals and the sum of residents and tourists exist because some pictures could 
not be assigned to either category 
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Tab. 2   Descriptive Statistics 
 No Photos All Photos Residents Tourists 
Berlin mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD 
Photo density index 0.00 0.00 0.89 8.17 1.28 23.24 1.97 11.09 
Distance to CBD (km) 10.36 3.20 6.61 3.57 6.23 3.52 4.86 3.10 
Distance to Station (km) 0.96 0.63 0.61 0.49 0.57 0.46 0.48 0.40 
Primary Road (Dummy) 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.41 
Pop. Dens. (1000/km
2
) 7.78 10.51 14.06 16.31 14.42 16.58 15.62 17.52 
Emp.Dens. (1000/km
2
) 0.85 3.53 4.97 23.23 5.51 23.56 7.70 29.63 
Park (Dummy) 0.59 0.49 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46 0.73 0.44 
Water(Dummy) 0.09 0.29 0.17 0.37 0.18 0.38 0.22 0.41 
Cont. Sig. Building (Count) 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.27 0.06 0.30 0.09 0.37 
Mon. Density  2.44 9.27 6.61 15.97 6.89 16.02 9.18 18.88 
Music Nodes (Count) 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.34 0.06 0.38 0.10 0.48 
Cultural Nodes (Count) 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.19 0.04 0.24 
Top 20 Tourist (Dummy) 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.19 
Gov. District (Dummy) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10 
Berlin Wall (Dummy) 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26 
N (Statistical Blocks)) 5689  5860  4613  2616  
London         
Photo Density (per km2) 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.69 0.19 0.96 0.29 1.45 
Distance to CBD (km) 11.96 4.00 8.16 4.09 7.86 4.00 6.91 3.92 
Distance to Station (km) 2.90 2.66 1.48 1.80 1.39 1.71 1.03 1.40 
Primary Road (Dummy) 0.17 0.38 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.33 0.47 
Emp.Dens. (1000/km
2
) 1.89 3.81 5.17 12.25 5.62 13.09 8.54 17.78 
Pop. Density (1000/km2) 1.68 1.94 12.45 9.14 12.34 9.08 12.10 10,00 
Thames (Dummy) 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.26 
Water (Dummy) 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.28 
Park (Dummy) 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.34 
Cont. Sig. Building (Count) 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.26 0.03 0.28 0.06 0.39 
Hist. Sig. Building (Count) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.17 0.02 0.24 
Cultural Node (Count) 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.31 0.04 0.33 0.08 0.47 
Music Nodes (Count) 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.37 0.05 0.40 0.09 0.56 
Top 20 Tourist (Dummy) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.08 
N (Output Areas) 2966  10799  9303  4544  
Notes: All Photos/Residents/Tourists are the group of blocks/output areas that contain at least one rec-
orded picture taken (by residents or tourists). Non-photo is the group of the remaining blocks and 
output areas. 
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Tab. 3   Determinants of Photo Activity (Berlin) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Photo 
Activity 
(0,1) 
Log Photo 
Density 
Log Photo 
Density 
Residents 
Log Photo 
Density 
Tourists 
Resident 
Photo 
(0,1) 
Tourist 
Photo 
(0,1) 
 Logit OLS OLS OLS Logit Logit 
Distance to CBD (km) -0.240
***
 
(0.008) 
-0.324
***
 
(0.008) 
-0.250
***
 
(0.009) 
-0.353
***
 
(0.014) 
0.124
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.112
***
 
(0.002) 
Distance to Station (km) -0.440
***
 
(0.045) 
-0.501
***
 
(0.052) 
-0.504
***
 
(0.061) 
-0.513
***
 
(0.103) 
0.062
***
 
(0.011) 
-0.079
***
 
(0.012) 
Primary Road (Dummy) -0.446
***
 
(0.058) 
0.523
***
 
(0.059) 
0.596
***
 
(0.065) 
0.596
***
 
(0.088) 
0.043
***
 
(0.010) 
0.046
***
 
(0.009) 
Log Employment Density 
(per km
2
) 
0.127
***
 
(0.007) 
0.016
*
 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Log Population Density 
(per km
2
) 
-0.041
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.027
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.015 
(0.008) 
-0.058
***
 
(0.011) 
0.051
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.042
***
 
(0.001) 
Park (Dummy) 0.067 
(0.048) 
-0.009 
(0.051) 
-0.012 
(0.056) 
0.158 
(0.082) 
-0.130
***
 
(0.008) 
0.040
***
 
(0.008) 
Water(Dummy) 0.585
***
 
(0.073) 
0.546
***
 
(0.067) 
0.383
***
 
(0.070) 
0.317
**
 
(0.097) 
-0.081
***
 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
Signature Building Con-
temporary (Count) 
1.367
***
 
(0.257) 
0.681
***
 
(0.091) 
0.470
***
 
(0.088) 
0.549
***
 
(0.104) 
-0.102
***
 
(0.005) 
0.013
***
 
(0.003) 
Log Monument Density 
(% at block area) 
0.070
***
 
(0.008) 
0.023
**
 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.020 
(0.011) 
-0.028
***
 
(0.001) 
0.031
***
 
(0.001) 
Music Nodes (Count) 1.775
***
 
(0.474) 
0.401
***
 
(0.068) 
0.462
***
 
(0.071) 
0.068 
(0.082) 
0.097
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.073
***
 
(0.003) 
Cultural Nodes (Count) 0.737
**
 
(0.282) 
0.541
***
 
(0.161) 
0.446
**
 
(0.145) 
0.322 
(0.166) 
-0.039
***
 
(0.008) 
0.030
***
 
(0.006) 
Top 20 Tourist Highlight 
(Dummy) 
1.427
**
 
(0.506) 
0.923
***
 
(0.168) 
0.776
***
 
(0.172) 
0.816
***
 
(0.184) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.071
***
 
(0.009) 
Berlin Wall (Dummy)  0.954
***
 
(0.283) 
0.372 
(0.259) 
0.802
**
 
(0.270) 
-0.073
***
 
(0.017) 
-0.179
***
 
(0.014) 
Government District 
(dummy) 
0.911
***
 
(0.185) 
0.218 
(0.117) 
-0.081 
(0.118) 
0.426
**
 
(0.152) 
-0.243
***
 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.007) 
Unit Blocks Blocks Blocks Blocks Photos Photos 
Observations 11520 5860 4613 2616 633635 633635 
R
2
  0.441 0.342 0.405   
AIC 12100.0 23070.6 17821.8 10498.6 691571.5 759674.9 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All coefficients correspond to marginal effects (at the 
man for logit models. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Tab. 4   Determinants of Photo Activity (London) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Photo 
Activity 
(0,1) 
Log Photo 
Density 
Log Photo 
Density 
Residents 
Log Photo 
Density 
Tourists 
Resident 
Photo 
(0,1) 
Tourist 
Photo 
(0,1) 
 Logit OLS OLS OLS Logit Logit 
Distance to CBD (km) -0.267
***
 
(0.008) 
-0.200
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.175
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.140
***
 
(0.008) 
0.027
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.033
***
 
(0.001) 
Distance to Station 
(km) 
-0.025
*
 
(0.013) 
-0.016 
(0.011) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
-0.072
***
 
(0.020) 
0.140
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.267
***
 
(0.005) 
Primary Road (Dum-
my) 
0.310
***
 
(0.060) 
0.140
***
 
(0.035) 
0.139
***
 
(0.037) 
-0.114
*
 
(0.051) 
0.055
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.127
***
 
(0.005) 
Log Employment Den-
sity (per km2) 
0.459
***
 
(0.029) 
0.446
***
 
(0.016) 
0.380
***
 
(0.017) 
0.339
***
 
(0.021) 
-0.069
***
 
(0.001) 
0.062
***
 
(0.002) 
Log Population Densi-
ty (per km2) 
-1.280
***
 
(0.047) 
-0.185
***
 
(0.024) 
-0.107
***
 
(0.026) 
0.235
***
 
(0.034) 
0.128
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.100
***
 
(0.002) 
Thames River (Dum-
my) 
1.384
***
 
(0.241) 
0.866
***
 
(0.073) 
0.751
***
 
(0.075) 
0.275
**
 
(0.090) 
-0.281
***
 
(0.004) 
0.112
***
 
(0.005) 
Water(Dummy) 0.139 
(0.094) 
0.076 
(0.055) 
0.152
**
 
(0.057) 
-0.225
**
 
(0.080) 
0.307
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.162
***
 
(0.009) 
Park (Dummy) 0.248
**
 
(0.082) 
0.429
***
 
(0.053) 
0.386
***
 
(0.057) 
0.460
***
 
(0.074) 
-0.017
***
 
(0.005) 
0.120
***
 
(0.006) 
Signature Building 
Contemporary (Count) 
0.310 
(0.545) 
0.058 
(0.066) 
0.120 
(0.063) 
0.151 
(0.082) 
0.056
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.045
***
 
(0.001) 
Signature Building 
Historic (Count) 
 0.069 
(0.131) 
-0.054 
(0.121) 
0.347
*
 
(0.168) 
-0.074
***
 
(0.002) 
0.045
***
 
(0.002) 
Cultural Nodes 
(Count) 
0.362 
(0.423) 
0.274
**
 
(0.083) 
0.304
***
 
(0.085) 
0.271
**
 
(0.084) 
0.015
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.011
***
 
(0.001) 
Music Nodes (Count) 1.785
**
 
(0.576) 
0.342
***
 
(0.068) 
0.374
***
 
(0.070) 
0.240
***
 
(0.059) 
0.043
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.018
***
 
(0.001) 
Top 20 Tourist High-
light (Dummy) 
 1.632
***
 
(0.276) 
1.381
***
 
(0.283) 
2.262
***
 
(0.307) 
-0.692
***
 
(0.004) 
0.418
***
 
(0.004) 
Unit OA OA OA OA Photos Photos 
Observations 13676 10799 9303 4544 1957081 1957081 
R
2
  0.356 0.292 0.328   
AIC 11423.5 41066.0 35375.5 17212.4 2555030.7 2038041.7 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All coefficients correspond to marginal effects (at the 
man for logit models. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Tab. 5   Structural Interpretation 
 Coefficient Interpretation  
Response Variable Residents Commerce 
Price/Floor Space  
Population or  
Employees/Floor Space Unit 
  
(   )
  ( ̂  ̂)
  
  
 ̂ (   )
   ̂  ̂ 
  
        
 ̂ (   )
   ̂  ̂ 
  
  (   ) ̂  
  (   ) ̂  
Price/Land Area 
Land Value / Land Area 
Capital to Land Ratio 
Population or Employees / Land 
Area 
  
   
  ( ̂  ̂)(   )
  
  
(   )(   ) ̂
  ( ̂  ̂)(   )
  
        
(   )(   ) ̂
  ( ̂  ̂)(   )
  
  (   )(   ) ̂  
  (   )(   ) ̂  
Floor Space Index  
(Floor Space/Land Area) 
 
  
(   )
  
   
 
( ̂  ̂)
  
  
(   )(   ) ̂
  (   )( ̂  ̂)
  
        
(   )(   ) ̂
  (   )( ̂  ̂)
  
  
(   )(   ) ̂
 
  
  
(   )(   ) ̂
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Tab. 6   Baseline Estimates – utility effects – Berlin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Log 
Price/m² 
Land Area 
Log 
Price/m² 
Land Area 
Log 
Price/m² 
Land Area 
Log 
Price/m² 
Floor Area 
Land 
Value/m² 
Land Area 
Log Ratio 
Capital/Land 
Log Floor 
Space 
Index 
Log Floor 
Space 
Index 
Log Pop./m² 
Housing 
Space 
Log 
Pop./m² 
Land Area 
Log Employment 
Potential 
0.331
***
 
(0.007) 
 
 
0.240
***
 
(0.008) 
0.022
**
 
(0.007) 
0.310
***
 
(0.004) 
0.244
***
 
(0.015) 
0.287
***
 
(0.008) 
0.646
***
 
(0.035) 
0.114
***
 
(0.019) 
0.513
***
 
(0.020) 
Log Photo Potential  
 
0.177
***
 
(0.004) 
0.024
***
 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.028
***
 
(0.001) 
0.026
***
 
(0.002) 
0.026
***
 
(0.001) 
0.033
***
 
(0.005) 
0.012
***
 
(0.003) 
0.045
***
 
(0.003) 
Protected Monument 
(Dummy) 
0.012 
(0.020) 
0.017 
(0.019) 
0.007 
(0.019) 
0.123
***
 
(0.016) 
 
 
0.072
*
 
(0.030) 
-0.203
***
 
(0.017) 
-0.214
***
 
(0.017) 
 
 
 
 
Emp. Pot. x 
Construction Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.002
***
 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
Photo Pot. x 
Construction Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
Hedonic Controls YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES   
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES   
Time x East Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES   
Observation units Trans. Trans. Trans. Trans. Trans. Trans. Trans. Trans. Blocks Blocks 
Observations 29153 29153 29153 29153 29151 25885 29153 29060 7392 7392 
R
2
 0.533 0.531 0.538 0.648 0.661 0.421 0.755 0.760 0.026 0.315 
AIC  52814.9 52914.6 52475.7 43249.2 17664.1 73485.9 49573.2 48703.9 19893.8 20269.2 
Decay Access (T
E
) 0.7  0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Decay Urbanity (T
P
)  1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
β 27.85% 29.71% 28.60% 31.26% 27.78% 28.53% 25.48% 28.29% 28.42% 25.58% 
 γ 4.15%  3.09% 0.68% 3.87% 3.14% 5.99% 3.18% 3.25% 5.90% 
1-α-β-γ  2.29% 0.31% 0.06% 0.34% 0.33% 0.54% 0.53% 0.33% 0.52% 
γ /(1- α) 12.96%  9.65% 2.11% 12.11% 9.80% 18.71% 9.94% 10.14% 18.44% 
(1-α-β-γ)/(1- α)  7.17% 0.97% 0.20% 1.06% 1.04% 1.67% 1.65% 1.04% 1.62% 
Effect of change in accessibility/urbanity from 1st to 99th percentile  
Access on            
Land Rent 116.18%  84.23% 16.88% 108.85% 85.83% 183.49% 87.78% 88.93% 179.68% 
Housing Rent 52.28%  37.90% 7.60% 48.98% 38.62% 82.57% 39.50% 40.02% 80.86% 
Space consumption -34.33%  -27.48% -7.06% -32.88% -27.86% -45.23% -28.32% -28.58% -44.71% 
Urbanity on           
Land Rent  138.64% 55.17% 10.32% 62.57% 59.54% 107.44% 95.18% 69.40% 104.33% 
Housing Rent  62.39% 24.83% 4.64% 28.16% 26.80% 48.35% 42.83% 31.23% 46.95% 
Space consumption  -38.42 -19.89% -4.44% -21.97% -21.13% -32.59% -29.99% -23.80% -31.95% 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
50
Tab. 7   Urbanity Decomposition & Gentrification Models – Berlin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log 
Price/m² 
Land Area 
Log 
Price/m² 
Land Area 
Log 
Price/m² 
Floor Area 
Log 
Price/m² 
Floor Area 
Log Price/m²  
Land  
Area 
Log Employment Potential 0.239
***
 
(0.010) 
0.212
***
 
(0.012) 
0.038
***
 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.217
***
 
(0.012) 
Log Photo Potential 0.015
***
 
(0.001) 
0.012
***
 
(0.001) 
0.005
***
 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.012
***
 
(0.001) 
Protected Monument (Dummy) 0.006 
(0.019) 
-0.013 
(0.020) 
0.090
***
 
(0.014) 
0.074
***
 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.019) 
Log Heritage  
Potential 
 
 
0.026
***
 
(0.003) 
 
 
0.009
***
 
(0.002) 
0.026
***
 
(0.003) 
Log Architecture Potential  
(Contemporary) 
 
 
0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.010
***
 
(0.001) 
0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
Log Cultural Potential (Mainstream)  
 
-0.003
**
 
(0.001) 
 
 
-0.002
*
 
(0.001) 
-0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
Log Music Node Potential  
 
0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.002
**
 
(0.001) 
-0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
Log Music Node Pot x  
Time Trend 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Hedonic Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Time x East Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
X/Y Coordinates YES YES YES YES YES 
Location Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Neigh. Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 29153 29153 29153 29153 29153 
R2 0.558 0.560 0.692 0.695 0.563 
AIC 51585.9 51324.7 39652.1 39210.8 51108.3 
Decay Access (T
E
) 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Decay Urbanity (T
P
) 6 6 6 6 6 
β 28.72% 29.07% 30.68% 31.56% 29.44% 
 γ 3.09% 2.77% 1.17% 0.41% 2.38% 
1-α-β-γ 0.19% 0.15% 0.15% 0.04% 0.17% 
γ /(1- α) 9.65% 8.66% 3.66% 1.27% 7.45% 
(1-α-β-γ)/(1- α) 0.60% 0.48% 0.47% 0.12% 0.55% 
Effect of change in accessibility/urbanity from 1st to 99th percentile  
Access on       
Land Rent 83.88% 74.40% 29.82% 10.03% 63.19% 
Housing Rent 37.74% 33.48% 13.42% 4.51% 28.43% 
Space consumption -27.40% -25.08% -11.83% -4.32% -22.14% 
Urbanity on      
Land Rent 29.82% 27.10% 24.79% 6.10% 30.28% 
Housing Rent 13.42% 12.20% 11.16% 2.75% 13.63% 
Space consumption -11.83% -10.87% -10.04% -2.67% -11.99% 
Changes relative to benchmark 
Accessibility (γ) -0.42% -11.67% 67.63% -40.60% -24.98% 
Urbanity (1-α-β-γ) -38.62% -50.88% 140.25% -40.87% -45.11% 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
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Tab. 8   Accessibility and Urbanity Effects (London) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Log 
Price/m² 
Floor Area 
Log 
Price/m² 
Floor Area 
Log 
Price/m² 
Floor Area 
Log 
Price/m² 
Floor Area 
Log 
Price/m² 
Floor Area 
Log 
Price/m² 
Floor Area 
Log 
Price/m² 
Floor Area 
Log Employment 
Potential 
0.192
***
 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.050
***
 
(0.001) 
0.075
***
 
(0.003) 
0.135
***
 
(0.011) 
0.137
***
 
(0.003) 
0.137
***
 
(0.003) 
Log Photo  
Potential 
 
 
0.057
***
 
(0.001) 
0.044
***
 
(0.003) 
0.010
***
 
(0.000) 
0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
0.003
***
 
(0.000) 
0.003
***
 
(0.000) 
Log Architecture 
P. (Historic) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.002
***
 
(0.000) 
0.002
***
 
(0.000) 
Log Architecture 
P. (Contemporary) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -0.002
***
 
(0.000) 
-0.002
***
 
(0.000) 
Log Cultural P. 
(Mainstream) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.002
***
 
(0.000) 
0.002
***
 
(0.000) 
Log Music Node 
Potential 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
0.002
**
 
(0.001) 
Log Music Node 
Pot x Time Trend 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000
***
 
(0.000) 
Hedonic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
X/Y Coordinates     YES YES YES 
Location Effects     YES YES YES 
Neigh. Effects     YES YES YES 
Observations 35881 35881 35881 35881 35858 35858 35858 
R
2
 0.510 0.551 0.555 0.541 0.710 0.715 0.715 
AIC 7069.1 3916.2 3640.9 4775.3 -11781.8 -12324.2 -12389.7 
Decay Access (T
E
) 0.9  4 1 1 1 1 
Decay Urb. (T
P
)  1 1 4 4 4 4 
β 26.84% 30.28% 29.26% 29.51% 28.09% 28.06% 28.07% 
 γ 5.16%  1.28% 2.20% 3.79% 3.85% 3.84% 
1-α-β-γ  1.72% 1.47% 0.29% 0.12% 0.08% 0.08% 
γ /(1- α) 16.12%  3.99% 6.87% 11.83% 12.05% 12.01% 
(1-α-β-γ)/(1- α)  5.36% 4.58% 0.90% 0.38% 0.26% 0.26% 
Effect of change in accessibility/urbanity from 1st to 99th percentile  
Access on         
Land Rent 134.92%  34.46% 53.13% 96.07% 97.92% 97.55% 
Housing Rent 60.71%  15.51% 23.91% 43.23% 44.06% 43.90% 
Space cons. -37.78%  -13.43% -19.29% -30.18% -30.59% -30.51% 
Urbanity on        
Land Rent  155.94% 137.92% 113.29% 50.41% 34.51% 34.76% 
Housing Rent  70.17% 62.06% 50.98% 22.68% 15.53% 15.64% 
Space cons.  -43.24% -38.30% -33.77% -18.49% -13.44% -13.53% 
Changes relative to benchmark 
Accessibility (γ)     +88.84% +84.32% +83.63 
Urbanity (1-α-β-γ)     -55.51% -69.54% -69.32% 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Tab. 9   Productivity Effects - Berlin 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.00. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Log 
Price/m² 
Land Area 
Log 
Price/m² 
Land Area 
Log 
Price/m² 
Land Area 
Log 
Price/m² 
Floor Area 
Log Land Val-
ue/m²Land Area 
Log Ratio 
Capital/Land 
Log Ratio 
Floor 
Space/Land 
Area 
Log Ratio 
Floor 
Space/Land 
Area 
Log 
Emp./m² 
Office 
Space 
Log 
Emp./m² 
Land Area 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Log Employment 
Potential 
0.541
***
 
(0.033) 
 
 
0.300
***
 
(0.044) 
0.141
***
 
(0.038) 
0.473
***
 
(0.034) 
0.330
***
 
(0.062) 
0.160
***
 
(0.026) 
-0.158
*
 
(0.080) 
0.211
***
 
(0.054) 
0.827
***
 
(0.046) 
Log Photo Poten-
tial 
 
 
0.116
***
 
(0.009) 
0.055
***
 
(0.009) 
0.034
***
 
(0.008) 
0.045
***
 
(0.006) 
0.053
***
 
(0.010) 
0.021
***
 
(0.005) 
0.023 
(0.014) 
0.019
**
 
(0.007) 
0.013
*
 
(0.005) 
Protected Monu-
ment (Dummy) 
0.252
***
 
(0.049) 
0.267
***
 
(0.050) 
0.244
***
 
(0.048) 
0.267
***
 
(0.042) 
0.102
**
 
(0.033) 
0.233
**
 
(0.079) 
-0.023 
(0.027) 
0.004 
(0.028) 
 
 
 
 
Log Emp. Pot. x 
Construction year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.002
***
 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
 
Log Photo Pot. x 
Construction year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Hedonics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Year x East Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 1657 1657 1657 1657 1657 1432 1657 1657 5600 6239 
R
2
 0.653 0.655 0.665 0.573 0.618 0.577 0.501 0.516 0.145 0.492 
AIC 3712.5 3703.7 3656.7 3228.5 2457.7 4124.3 1493.7 1446.8 18437.4 19685.5 
Decay Access (T
E
) 4  5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Decay Urbanity 
(T
P
) 
 6 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
   4.06%  2.25% 2.11% 3.55% 2.47% 2.40% 4.88% 3.17% 12.41% 
    0.86% 0.41% 0.51% 0.34% 0.40% 0.31% 0.28% 0.29% 0.20% 
Effect of change in accessibility/urbanity from 1st to 99th percentile  
Access on           
Land rent 293.67%  175.26% 164.04% 276.09% 192.57% 186.46% 380.11% 271.67% 1064.31% 
Office space rent 146.83%  87.63% 82.02% 138.04% 96.28% 93.23% 190.05% 135.84% 532.16% 
Space/Employee -59.49%  -46.70% -45.06% -57.99% -49.05% -48.25% -65.52% -57.60% -84.18% 
Urbanity on            
Land rent  262.80% 170.65% 211.72% 140.02% 164.81% 129.70% 116.37% 143.49% 98.49% 
Office space rent  131.40% 85.32% 105.86% 70.01% 82.41% 64.85% 58.18% 71.74% 49.24% 
Space/Employee  -56.79% -46.04% -51.42% -41.18% -45.18% -39.34% -36.78% -41.77% -33.00% 
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Tab. 10   Urbanity Decomposition – Berlin Commercial  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)   
 Log Price/m² 
Land Area 
Log Price/m² 
Land Area 
Log Price/m² 
Floor Area 
Log Price/m² 
Floor Area 
  
Log Employment Poten-
tial 
0.196
***
 
(0.049) 
0.217
***
 
(0.049) 
0.080 
(0.044) 
0.119
**
 
(0.045) 
  
Log Photo Potential 0.057
***
 
(0.009) 
0.074
***
 
(0.009) 
0.036
***
 
(0.008) 
0.056
***
 
(0.008) 
  
Protected Monument 
(Dummy) 
0.205
***
 
(0.047) 
0.187
***
 
(0.047) 
0.221
***
 
(0.041) 
0.204
***
 
(0.040) 
  
Log Heritage  
Potential 
 
 
0.206
***
 
(0.044) 
 
 
0.174
***
 
(0.037) 
  
Log Architecture Poten-
tial (Contemp.) 
 
 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
 
 
-0.011 
(0.010) 
  
Log Cultural Potential 
(Mainstream) 
 
 
-0.023
***
 
(0.006) 
 
 
-0.021
***
 
(0.005) 
  
Log Music Node Potential  
 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
 
 
-0.016
*
 
(0.008) 
  
Hedonic Effects YES YES YES YES   
YES Year x East Effects YES YES YES YES   
Location effects YES YES YES YES   
Observations 1657 1657 1657 1657   
R
2
 0.689 0.706 0.614 0.639   
AIC 3597.5 3514.5 3174.2 3044.5   
  1.47% 1.63% 1.20% 1.79%   
  0.43% 0.55% 0.55% 0.84%   
Effect of change in accessibility/urbanity from 1st to 99th percentile  
Access on       
Land rent 114.15% 126.88% 93.34% 139.47%   
Office space rent 57.08% 63.44% 46.67% 69.74%   
Space/Employee -36.34% -38.82% -31.82% -41.09%   
Urbanity on        
Land rent 176.74% 230.13% 226.61% 349.54%   
Office space rent 88.37% 115.06% 113.31% 174.77%   
Space/Employee -46.91% -53.50% -53.12% -63.61%   
Changes relative to benchmark 
Accessibility ( ) -34.87% -27.60% -43.10% -14.98%   
Urbanity ( ) +3.57% +34.86% +7.03% +65.09%   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Tab. 11   Sorting (Berlin) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Expenditure share at housing consumption 
 Accessibility Accessibility Urbanity Urbanity 
Employment Potential 0.486
***
 0.154
***
   
Photo Potential   -0.638
***
 -0.657
***
 
Age Index  -0.001  0.037
***
 
Purchasing Power   -0.244
***
  -0.049
***
 
Share FDP/Die Grünen  0.164
***
  0.030
**
 
Nationality: Non-German (%)  0.229
***
  0.085
***
 
Observations 28714 28714 28714 28714 
R
2
 0.234 0.328 0.406 0.418 
AIC -123258.2 -125104.3 -239814.5 -243700.2 
Notes: Standardized beta coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are bootstrapped 
using 100 replications . * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
Tab. 12   Sorting (London) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Expenditure share at housing consumption 
 Accessibility Accessibility Urbanity Urbanity 
Employment Potential 0.157
***
 0.035
***
   
Photo Potential   0.182
***
 0.112
***
 
Age Index  -0.149
***
  0.012
*
 
Income Estimate   0.046
***
  -0.070
***
 
Qualification Index   0.315
***
  0.309
***
 
Ethnic group: White (%)  -0.261
***
  -0.022
**
 
Observations 35858 35858 35858 35858 
R
2
 0.025 0.226 0.033 0.108 
AIC -125838.2 -134108.6 -425979.4 -428871.1 
Notes: Standardized beta coefficients Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are bootstrapped 
using 100 replications. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1   Land Values 
 
 
Notes: Berlin (left) data are assessed land values (from the Committee of Valuation experts). London (da-
ta) is the residual land prices estimated based on Nationwide Building Society property transaction 
data in auxiliary regressions. 
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Estimating Delta 
From the zero profit condition in the construction sector we know that: 
   ( ) ( )          
 ( ) ( )
 
 
 
(   )
 ( )  
First order conditions of the housing production function (20) imply: 
 
( )
 
 ( ) ( )  ( ) 
 
 
 
   
 ( )  
I estimate δ separately for residential and commercial properties in two alternative ap-
proaches. First, I run a regression of property transaction prices per land area on assessed 
pure land values (1) and (2). Second, I approximate the capital to land ratio by the ratio of 
property prices net of the assessed land value of a property to the land area (3) and (4). 
TAB A1   Estimated Output Elasticity of Land (Berlin) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Price (€) 
/Land (m²) 
Price (€) 
/Land (m²) 
Capital (€) 
/Land (m²) 
Capital (€) 
/Land (m²) 
Land Value  
(per m²) 
2.38
***
 
(0.03) 
1.98
***
 
(0.07) 
1.23
***
 
(0.03) 
1.08
***
 
(0.06) 
Constant 225.48
***
 
(10.27) 
3091.87
***
 
(247.82) 
239.04
***
 
(10.63) 
2907.63
***
 
(222.91) 
Land Use Residential Commerce Residential Commerce 
Observations 25489 1209 25489 1209 
R
2
 0.237 0.429 0.072 0.216 
AIC 412488.6 24620.3 414216.3 24364.2 
Implied 1-δ 0.42 0.50 0.45 0.48 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A2 - Variables Description 
Berlin  
Dependent Variables  
Log Price/Land Area Ratio of the Property transaction price in € to the area of the corre-
sponding plot of land. Transaction data from the Committee of Valua-
tion Experts (GAA).  
Price/Floor Area Ratio of the Property transaction price in € to the total floor area. trans-
action data from the GAA. 
Land Value/Land Area Land value per square meter land area. Assessed by the GAA. 
Capital/Land Ratio of total property price net of land value to the area of the corre-
sponding plot of land. Based on transaction data from the GAA. 
Floor space index (FSI) Ratio of the total floor area to the area of the corresponding plot of 
land. Transaction data from the GAA. 
Population/Housing 
Space 
Ratio of the 2005 population (from the Berlin Statistical Office) to the 
total floor area in a statistical block unit. Total floor area is approximat-
ed by the typical local FSI (from the GAA) multiplied by the block land 
area (computed in GIS). 
Population/Land Area Ratio of the 2005 population (from the Berlin Statistical Office) in a sta-
tistical block unit to the block land area (computed in GIS). 
Employment/Office 
Space 
Ratio of the 2003 workplace employment (from the Berlin Statistical 
Office) to the total floor area in a statistical block unit. Total floor area is 
approximated by the typical local FSI (from the GAA) multiplied by the 
block land area (computed in GIS). 
Employment/Land Area Ratio of the 2003 workplace employment (Berlin Statistical Office) in a 
statistical block unit to the block land area (computed in GIS). 
Independent Variables  
Year Effects Set of yearly dummy variables (based on transaction data from the GAA) 
Year x East Effects Yearly dummy variables multiplied by a dummy variable for properties 
located in former East-Berlin (created in GIS). 
X/Y Coordinates X- and Y-coordinate in projected meter units (Soldner Coordinates). 
Transaction data from the GAA 
Hedonic Effects Set of property variables shown in Table A3a. Part of the transaction 
data from the GAA. 
Location Effects Set of locational variables created in GIS based on the Urban and Envi-
ronmental Information System (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 
Berlin, 2006) including: Local Noise level in db, distance to nearest U-
Bahn or S-Bahn station, distance to the nearest industry area, distance 
to the nearest main street, distance to the nearest green area and dis-
tance to the nearest water area. 
Neighbourhood Effects Set of neighborhood variables including: purchasing power per capita 
(estimates from the GFZ, postcode level), share of non-Germans at total 
population, share of age groups at total population (0-6, 6-15, 15-18, 18-
27, 45-55, 55-65, 65+) (Berlin Statistical Office, block level) 
London  
Dependent Variable  
Price/Floor Area Ratio of the Property transaction price in € to the area of the corre-
sponding plot of land. Transaction data from the Nationwide Building 
Society (NBS). 
Independent Variables  
Year Effects Set of yearly dummy variables (based on transaction data from the NBS). 
X/Y Coordinates X- and Y-coordinate in projected meter units (British National Grid). 
Reprojected in GIS from geographic coordinates (latitudes & longitudes) 
Hedonic Effects Set of property variables shown in Table A3b. Part of the transaction 
data from the NBS. 
Location Effects Set of locational variables created in GIS including: distance to the near-
est underground/dockland light railway station, distance to the nearest 
river, distance to the nearest park, rail line within 250m (dummy), pri-
mary road within 250m.  
Neighborhood Effects Set of neighborhood variables including: share of white population at 
total population (2001 census, output area level), average income (2001 
census, ward level), average key stage 2 test score (average output area 
scores, interpolated in GIS), shares of age groups at total population (0-
9, 10-15, 16-19, 20-29, 45-59, 60-74, 75+,2001 census, output area level) 
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Table A3a   Hedonic Estimates Berlin 
 (1) (2) 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Log Employment Potential 0.240
***
 (0.008) 0.300
***
 (0.044) 
Log Photo Potential 0.024
***
 (0.001) 0.055
***
 (0.009) 
Protected Monument (Dummy) 0.007 (0.019) 0.244
***
 (0.048) 
Property located at frontage (Dummy) -0.032 (0.035) -0.259 (0.204) 
Property located at corner (Dummy) 0.083
*
 (0.036) 0.084 (0.205) 
Property located at multiple frontages (Dummy) -0.150
***
 (0.041) -0.050 (0.209) 
Demoted property (Dummy) -0.195
***
 (0.048) -0.509
*
 (0.254) 
Backyard property (Dummy) -0.024 (0.038) -0.431 (0.306) 
Building Age (Years) -0.009
***
 (0.001) -0.005
**
 (0.002) 
Building Age squared 0.000
***
 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Condition: good (Dummy) 0.455
***
 (0.012) 0.678
***
 (0.054) 
Condition: good (Dummy) -0.530
***
 (0.013) -0.325
***
 (0.072) 
Flat roof (Dummy) -0.261
***
 (0.015) -0.184
*
 (0.080) 
Pent roof (Dummy) -0.059
**
 (0.021) -0.189 (0.126) 
Span roof (Dummy) -0.354
***
 (0.013) 0.019 (0.115) 
Berlin roof (Dummy) 0.046
***
 (0.012) 0.303
***
 (0.074) 
Hipped roof (Dummy) -0.343
***
 (0.015) -0.051 (0.179) 
Mansard roof (Dummy) -0.206
***
 (0.021) 0.705
*
 (0.322) 
Domed roof (Dummy) -0.400
***
 (0.027)   
Attic flat (Dummy) 0.134
***
 (0.008) 0.188
***
 (0.045) 
Elevator (Dummy) 0.233
***
 (0.023) 0.199
***
 (0.050) 
Basement (Dummy) 0.272
***
 (0.014) -0.016 (0.066) 
Underground car park (Dummy) 0.441
***
 (0.104) -0.028 (0.214) 
Seller: (Public) authority (Dummy) -0.329
***
 (0.023) -0.435
***
 (0.094) 
Seller: Housing Association (Dummy) -0.058
***
 (0.014) -0.349
***
 (0.089) 
Seller: (Private) Juristic Person (Dummy) 0.120
***
 (0.009) 0.134
**
 (0.047) 
Buyer: (Public) Authority (Dummy) -0.229
*
 (0.096) 0.174 (0.176) 
Buyer: Housing Association (Dummy) 0.094 (0.073) -0.744 (0.871) 
Buyer: (Private) Juristic Person (Dummy) 0.175
***
 (0.010) 0.353
***
 (0.067) 
Charge for local public infrastructure -0.115
***
 (0.012) 1.182
***
 (0.130) 
Property is not occupied by renter 0.115
***
 (0.011) 0.183 (0.101) 
Share (%) secondary structure at sales price -4.311
***
 (0.567) -2.679 (1.682) 
Month (1-12 Trend) -0.000 (0.001) 0.024
***
 (0.005) 
Constant 7.850
***
 (0.052) 10.446
***
 (0.309) 
Year Effects YES  YES  
Year x East Effects YES  YES  
Sample Residential Commercial 
Observations 29153  1657  
R
2
 0.538  0.665  
AIC 52475.7  3656.7  
Notes: Dependent variable is price (€) per land area (m²) in both models. Baseline models are columns (3) 
in Tables (6) and (9). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A3b - Hedonic Estimates London 
 (1)  
 Coeff S.E. 
Log Employment Potential 0.097
***
 (0.003) 
Log Photo Potential 0.005
***
 (0.000) 
Building Age (Years) 0.001
***
 (0.000) 
Building Age squared -0.000
***
 (0.000) 
Central Heating (Full) 0.035
***
 (0.007) 
Central Heating (Partial) 0.030
**
 (0.010) 
Garage (Single or Double) 0.034
***
 (0.005) 
Parking Space 0.058
***
 (0.004) 
Property Type: Detached 0.054
***
 (0.012) 
Property Type: Semi-Detached -0.027
**
 (0.008) 
Property Type: Terraced -0.075
***
 (0.008) 
Property Type: Cottage 0.045 (0.026) 
New Property 0.165
***
 (0.010) 
Property sells under leasehold -0.013 (0.008) 
Year Effects Yes  
Observations 35881  
R
2
 0.533  
AIC 5358.0  
Notes: Dependent variable is price (€) per floor space (m²). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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